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made considerably less difficult by the willingness of many people to discuss particular
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comment tlpon lily various dl,~fts and to show me their own, as yet uncompleted,
research.
In the first place 1 am grateful to Peter Bacon and Terry Baker who provided
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followed all of his plentiful suggestions I would have written more than one research
paper. In the course of writing the paper I received help from Bob Jennings (Foras
Forbartha) who also commented upon the completed paper, Bill Licken (Department
of the Environment), Donal de Buitleir (Commission on Taxation), Brendan Dowling
(J. anti E. Davy), Declan Walsh, Eithne Fi~gerald, Michael Green (Construction
Industry. Federation), Patrick Honohan and Liam O’Reilly (Cenu~l Bank). Among my
colleagues at the ESRI I am grateful to all members who participated at the seminars
and particularly to John FitzGerald and Denis Conniffe fi’om whom 1 got numerous
ideas. Paddy Geary, John Kennan and Adrian Rafter), also gave advice, particularly on
the estimation aspects of the paper. 1 am also indebted to other researchers in the area:
Brian Nolan, Martin Kenneally and J. McCarthy and Rodney Thorn. 1 have drawn
considerably upon their work and have avoided some pitfalls as a result. While I share
not all of their conclusions (as will be evident upon reading this paper) the results I
report have been strongly influenced by their endeavours.
1 am also indebted to the secretarial staffand the administration at the ESRI. To the
former for their production in orderly form of my manuscripts and to the latter for the
opportunity to spend a most enjoyable and productive year in Dublin. Lastly to
Concordia Universiu, who granted me a year’s leave and also financed my travel to
enable me to write the final draft in Dublin.
All remaining errors are my own responsibility.
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GENERAL SUMMARY
1. Introduction
The housing market in h’eland in the 1970s could be characterised as follows:
--Snbstantial increases ill the price 9f new and secondhand houses were
registered. Accompanying these were large increases in land prices. The rate
of growth in both hmd and house prices generally outstripped the rate of
increase in tile consunler price index.
--Major changes in legislation governing building and in the direct and
indirect subsidlsation of housing were implemented by successive
governnlents.
--The houses buih in the late ’seventies were very different in size, design and
type ("estate" versus "one-ofF’) fi’om those buih in the early ’seventies.
--The number of new houses built each year in the ’seventies was ahnost
double the number buih in the early and mid-sixties.
The purpose of this paper is, broadly, to examine tile reasons for these
stylised facts. Further, the purpose is to analyse the events of the ’seventies with
a view to offering some conclusions on tile eft]caw of government policies in
relation to stated objectives. It is not the objective of the paper to analyse all
aspects of the housing market. Tile focus of attention here is primarily upon the
new private housing sector with an emphasis upon causative and ctuantifiable
behaviour.
The motivation for this study springs from several sources. First, concern
over housing prices has played a major role in public policy making, as
witnessed by the many changes in legislation which have taken place. Second,
the granting of substantial subsidies to tile housing sector raises questions
regarding the intent and effects of such subsidisation. Third, the absence of
quantitative analysis in certain areas has made the evaluation of government
policies veW difficult.
The major findings of this study relate to (a) the tax system (b) the cost of
home ownership (c) an examination of econometric modelling of the housing
market (d) an analysis of the interrelationships between the different segments
of the market and the place of price controls in this system (e) the evolution of
housing quality and (t’) tile utilisation of space.
ix
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2. Economic Concept5
Possibly the most difficult hurdle to scale in conducting public discussion on
the government’s role in housing is to forntulate concepts through which such a
discussion can be moderated. Consistent policies cannot be formulated if one
group in society uses only norms ofecotlornic efficiency while another uses only
norms of equity.
When economists invoke the concept of an efficient allocation of resources they
refer to conditions of operation in the economy such that resources are not
wasted. In technical terms, an efficient use of a resource is one in which it is used
to a point where the marginal cost to society equals the rnarginal value placed
upon it. If solely notions of efficiency were of concern the major justification
for government intervention would be to counter market failure. But this is
rarely the case. Few, if any, societies have a minimalist role for governrnent and
a feature of most is a stated concern with’equality.
Thus the formulation of housing policy must seek to balance the efficient
allocation of resources with considerations of equity. And in these
circumstances the economist cannot always say that a certain policy is "right"
or "wrong" or "inappropriate" without invoking some normative standard.
Unfortunately, in some instances the formulation of policy seems to have been
undertaken in an environment in which such trade-offs were not ahvays
recognised.
3. The Income To~x. System
The income t,’Lx system provides incentives for home ownership in ~vo
imt)ortant ways. First, the imputed income from home ownership is not taxed.
Second, within varving limits, mortgage interest has been tax deductible. It has
been a widely held belief that households have faced increasing marginal
income tax rates during the ’seventies and that as a consequence there has been
an increasing incentive to purchase housing because of the provisions of the
inconle tax code.
Thus, in examining tile effect of the income tax code tile first task is to
examine the trend in the tax rate. Since data are not available directly on the tax
rates paid lay house purchasers for the whole period these Pates must be
estimated. The estimatiorl is carried out by fitting a regression line to data
which are available [’or a subperiod and the resulting estimates are then used to
simulate tile tax rates for typical house buyers for the remaining period. The
results indicate that tile rate facing purchasers has increased from
approximately 26 per cent in 1969 to 40 per cent in 1979 due to the lack of full
indexation in the t,’Lx schedule. The income splitting provisions of the 1980
budget lowered this for married couples.
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While the t,-ex rate thus increased substantially, it is to be emphasised that this
provision alone was not sufficient to encourage investment in housing rather
than any other asset. The general provision for interest deduction (rather than
just mortgage interest) would insure investment in a variety of forms were it not
for the fact that housing provides a very good form of collateral and has been
perceived as an asset which would likely yield a higher noo-t,xxable capital gain.
4. The Cost of Home Oumership
Rising house prices have led to considerable concern on the part of successive
governments over the ability of families to afford housing. The consequences of
such concern have been in the form of purchase incentives and subsidies. What
has been absent in this process is a clear formulation of what the cost of home
ownership has been. In Chapter 3 of the study cost estimates are developed for
typical purchasers of new houses for the period 1970-1980.
At the outset a distinction is made between the purchase price oft house and
the cost of ownership (which is termed the cost of capital in the text). The cost of
ownership for any time period is defined as the mortgage cost plus
maintenance, depreciation and property taxes minus capital gains and tax
savings attributable to the non-taxation of imputed income and mortgage
interest. The estimates so obtained show that the cost for new home purchases
has been strongly negative for several years in the ’seventies. This fact has been
due primarily to substantial capital gains and to the savings on income taxes.
These negative costs raise at least two questions. First, is it necessa~’y to
subsidise housing to the extent then undertaken? Second, what are the
mechanics of the operation of the market which have resuhed in almost
continual capital gains?
It seems that subsidisation is undertaken because of the recognition of the
high car~2,’ing costs relative to income despite the restdting gains to households
at all ranges of the income distribution. If carrying costs concerns are the
reason for subsidisation it is unclear why the government has not been more
active in mortgage poliq’ by providing incentives to mortgage granting
instittulons to vary the type of mortgages offered. The availability of alternative
insnunlents wonld obviate some of the perceived need for the present costly
subsidisation which cause very regressive income distributional effects.
While recent governments have made movements in this direction, in the
form of the Housing Finance Agency, why such instruments are being proposed
only for low income groups remains unanswered. The distributional
consequences of high and middle income households being financed by
subsitlisetl interest rates, with lower middle income households paying higher
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rates are severe. When, further, tile historic practice of permitting mortgage
interest deductions to be naade at the marginal rate of tax is considered together
with the interest subsidisatioll policies, a pattern of subsidies emerges which is
unusually regressive.
The second question, collcerning the equilibration of markets is addressed in
Chapters 4 and 5. Here it is argued that restricted mortgage availability, the
consu’aining role of current rather than life cycle incomes and possibly
inaccurate price forecasts have prevented immediate equilibration.
5. Ojzality Changes in New Housing
While house prices registered substantial increases during the period under
consideration, some of the increase is attributable to the fact that the houses
buih at the end ol’the period were larger and better constructed than the houses
buih al the beginning. Reasons for this trend are proposed in Chapter 2. It is
proposed th;u, in addition to the effects of higher incomes and an expanding
population, Ihe evolution of size and quality has been attributable to the
structure of state grants, the existence and subsequent abolition of rates
together with regulations governing their sliding scale remission when
operative, the structure of developntent of building sites, the housing market
recession of 1974/75, the cost of working capital, the role of price controls and
to die general battel3’ of incentives to purchase housing.
6. Econometric Models
The existing rather small body of econometric work on the housing market is
examined in Chapters 4 and 5. While substantial insights into the operation of
Ihe market and into the nmdelling diffictdties have been generated as a resuh of
this work, un[orttmately the statistical estimates arrived at in some of the work
are unsatisfactoW. While some of the problems here are solvable, the major
difficuhy in economeu’ic modelling lies in the numerous changes in
circumstances and legislation governing the market. These continual changes
make the outlook for econometric work dim.
7. The Optimal Amount of Housing and the Utilisation of Space
An important and much neglected aspect of housing policy concerns whether
or not the housing stock is efficiently used. For example, do overcrowding and
underutilisation simuhaneously exist? It is argued here that the heaW emphasis
on the consu-uction of new owner occupied dwellings in housing policy,
combined with the relative neglect of a private rental sector and the
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maintenance of the existing stock, has led to a less than ideal pattern of
development. In addition, the very high costs associated with moving, in part
attributahle to stamp duties, has restricted mobility and thus led IO a less than
t\lll utilisation of many houses.
8. The Housing Market, Price Controls and the Kenny Report
In the final chapter of the paper a model of the functioning of the whole
housing market is offered. This consists of an examination of the
intcrrelationships between the markct For the existing stock of houses, tile flow
of new houses and the land market. By recognising the essential difference
between stocks and flows and further recognising the fact that new house prices
do not move from one cquilihrium to another instantaneously, it is possible Io
draw inferences for current issues of policy. In particular it is illustrated ihat the
prima~T effects of price controls are redistributive and that their long-run effect
on the price of even new houses is negligible. The clear implication of this
conclusion is that the purpose of the system of price controls presently in
operation (Certificates of Reasonable Value (CRV)) inust be called into
question.
This franlcwork further provides a vehicle for examining the proposals in the
"Kennv" report. The principal theme of this chaplet is to illustrale that the
deternlination of equilibrium prices must be viewed fi’ont a behavioural rather
than an accounting framework. (One of the most unlbrtunatc aspects of policy
making in recent years in relation to controlling prices has been that, even
though praiseworthy in intent, the major long-run effects of the system of new
house price controls have had little to do with controlling prices). The purpose
of Ihe Kenny report recommendations was to ensure that some of the incre~lse
in land values (primarily due to servicing with water and sewage facilities) bc
caplured by the Local Aulhorities. It is proposed in the paper thai, if the
recommendations regarding compulsory purchase are implemented, it is nol
necessalT thai the land be resold cheaply to developers in order to benclit home
huycrs. Rat}let the land could be sold at full market price and the funds so
obtained could be used for whatever purpose the comnaunity or Local
Atnliority dcenas suitable.
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1. 1. Purpose and Motivation for the Stud),
Tile housing market ill Ireland in the 1970s could be characterised as Ibllows:
-- Substantial increases in the price of new and secondhand houses were
registered. Accompanying these were large increases in land prices. The
rate o[" growth in both land and house prices generally outstripped tile
rate of increase in tile consnHler price index.
-- Major changes in legislation governing building and in the direct and
indirect snbsidisation of housing were implemented by snccessive
govel’nlllents.
-- The houses being built in tile late ’seventies were vex~, different in size and
design (which we shallterm "quality") and in type ("estate" versus "one-
o11"’) from those built in tile early ’seventies.
--The number of new houses built each year in tile ’seventies was almost
double tile nunaber huih in ttle early and mid-sixties.
The purpose of this paper is, broadly, to examine tile reasons for these
"stvlised facts". Further, tile purpose is to analyse the events of tile ’seventies
witJt a view to oflizring some conclusions oil tile etllcac3/of government policies
in relation to stated objectives. It is not the objective of tile paper to analyse all
aspects of the housing market. Such a wide-ranging analysis has already been
carried ot, I by Baker and O’Brien (1979). Tile focus of attention herc is
primarily upon the new private housing sector of the market with an emphasis
upon causative and quantiiiable behaviour.
The motivation Ibr undertaking this study springs fi’om several sources. In
the first place, concern over housing prices has played a major role in public poll0’
making. The system of grants in place in the mid- 1970s, designed to facilitate the
purchase of all types of housing, has undergone changes. These changes have
come in the form of increased cash grants, tile abolition of rates, new mortgage
interest allowances for income tax purposes and changes in regulations
governing qualification for grants. In conjunction with the introduction of
more direct house price control methods (Certificates of Reasonable Value)
these measures were aimed both at keeping the price of houses within range of a
greater number of purchasers and stimulating tile building sector.
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A second reason tbr examination of Ihe housing market springs [1"o111 the
economic cleavage between those families who olm~ houses and those who do not. Those
who invested in housing before the period of high inflation gained relative to
ot hers. The redistribution of wealth which the inflation brought about has been
exacerbated by higher interest rates and higher deposit requirements; and these
developments have made it more difllcult for those on one side of the cleavage
to catch up with those on the other. Apart fi’om participation in pension
schemes, owning a home is the most widespread vehicle which families have at
their disposal to aecunaulate capital. As a consequence, factors which generate
barriers to the attainment of that goal Ibr a large segment of the population can
have serious social consequences, particularly as the encouragenlent of home
ownership has heen a priority for most governments in Ireland to the extent
dmL with a home ownership rate of approximately 75 per cent, h’elaud has one
of the highest rates in Europe.
A furdler motivation, and this refers in particular to the measurement problems,
is that in conjunction with government concern over the state of housing-- and
partly as a response to it -- economists and econometricians have begun to
analyse tile nl;srket. For researchers seeking so]utiol’Is to issues of policy making
Ihrough die construction o[ analytical models, it is of prime importance that
meaningl]al daui series be used. It is thus one of the major objectives of this
sludy to develop ;appropriate data series. It will be argued in the paper that data
nleastlrelncnl errors in soule ol" the existing ecououletric work are serious
enough to casl doubt on the conclusions of these studies. This applies in
pilrtictll:lr IU 1he ineastlrenlent OJ" tax alld quality adjusted price variables
(Chapter 2) and the cost of capital (Chapter 3).
Fourlh, the motivation for examining the housing market springs from a
concern expressed in recent years regarding the allocation of investment in different
sectors of the economy. With rates of investment which are vet3, high by
international standards it might be expected that the long-term outlook for the
economy would be vet3’ favourable. But with slow growth the overall allocation
O[ invesuneut warrants examination.
Finally, it is hoped that the current paper will serve as an input to polio, making
in at least two ways. First, data series are developed which have to this point in
tinae been unavailable. A clearer knowledge of what has actually happened
should nlakc a better evaluation ofcurrent policies possible. Second, the paper
illustrates that certain policies which have been adopted have not always had
the desired consequences. For example, the uniuersality of certain programmes,
such as mortgage interest deduetibilit3,
, 
can be regressive in the income
distributional sense. The multiple effects of specific measures (for example, the
adverse consequences on the rental sector of heavily loading building incentives
in favour of new owner occupied houses) have not always been recognised.
INTRODUCTION 3
The present paper is not the first to address the private housing market. A
series of studies have been done oil the role of subsidies (e.g., McKeon and
Jennings (I 978) or N ESC (1977)}, tile behaviour of the mortgage market (Hewitt
and Thorn (1979) or O’Loughlin (I 980)), the land market (Jennings (1980)) and
tile housing systmn in general (Baker and O’Brien (1979)). In addition,
econometric work, to be reviewed in Chapter 4, has been done on the market
for private new houses by Nolan (1980), Keneally and McCarthy (1982) and
Thont (1983). One of the distinguishing features of the present paper is its focus
upon the role which government has played in the private house building
market. It thus bears similarity in philosophy and intent to the latter named
papers but has a different focus.
In concluding this introduction it should be noted that the period covered in
the study effectively ends at 1981. This is because the (first draft) of the work was
completed in 1982 and while there have been several changes of an institutional
type in the interim, time and finance have not permitted me to examine these in
detail. In light of the changes in market conditions in the early ’eighties it would
be fl’uitt\~l to update the work on the cost of capital and the behaviour of tax
rates in particular. However, it is hoped both that the methodology defining
such a’n undertaking has been made clear enough to facilitate such updating,
and that the principles underlying the functimling of the various segments of
thc market have likewise been sufficiently clearly stated to facilitate an
unclerstanding of the effects of the institutional changes.
Throughout the paper constant attention is paid to the notions of efficient3,
and equip: (discussed in Chapter 2.1). In particular, emphasis is placed upon
the efl]cient use of resources and an efficient use of the existing stock. Since 1982
eeonmnic conditions have slackened with resuhing excess supply in the
construction industW. Should government policy be directed towards
stimulating this sector of theeconomy, it is to be hoped that such a stimulus
would recognise the quasi irreversibility of new housing investment and that
encouragement to the sector would pay heed to the needs of an orderly long-
term development of the market rather than be dictated by the stage of the
economic wcle in which we now find ourselves.
I. II Economic Concepts
Possibly the most difficult hurdle to scale in the attempt to conduct
disct~ssion in the public domain on the role of government in relation to
housing is the forrnulation of a set ofconcepts through which such a discussion
can be moderated. Consistent policies cannot be formulated if one group in
society uses only norms of economic efficiency while another uses only norms
of equity in their decisions governing the allocation of resources.
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When economists invoke the concept of an efficient allocation of resources they
refer to conditions of operation in the economy such that resources are not
wasted. In technical terms an efficient use of a resource is one where it is used to
a point where the marginal cost to society equals the marginal value which
society places upon it. If the value exceeds the cost, more of the resource should
be used in production, if the cost exceeds the value, less should be used. It is
important to emphasise that optimal resource allocation shotdd be defined in
terms of social costs and wdues. If there are no externalities generated by the
activity social and private measures are equivalent. (An example of an
externality in this sphere would be the building of a block offlats overlooking
small houses and thus robbing them of daylight).
When elt]ciency is defined in terms of marginal equivalences it is
straightforward to see that, by intervening in the market place through the
granting of subsidies and the le~,ing of taxes, the government might distort the
allocation process and thus engender a misdirection of scarce resources. For
example, by granting income tax relief on mortgage interest the government
lowers the effective cost of house purchase and thus encourages individuals to
purchase more housing than they would in the absence of such a policy. Some
economists (though not dais one) would thus argue that there is no role for the
government in the market place.
The principle can be seen very easily by means of Figure 1.1. The curve D
represents some individual’s demand. It could also be termed the individual’s
marginal evaluation curve (Silberberg (1978) p. 350-362). The curve S is the
supply curve and in a competitive industry will generally represent the marginal
cost of producing the good (here housing). With a free market the h0 units of
housing are purchased. At this point marginal private cost and value are equal,
as are the marginal social cost and value in the absence of externalities.
With the introduction of, for example, a subsidy to the supplier cost, to the
purchaser falls to S~ and it is now optimal for the individual to purchase h ~ units
of housing. However, this is no longer a social optimum. The reason is that the
cost to society of h~ units of housing is given by Rt whereas the cost to the
individual is given by Pl. There is thus an efficiency loss in the sense that the
resources would be valued more highly if put to another use. The ensuing loss is
referred to as a "deadweight" loss or a loss in producer’s and/or consumer’s
"surplus" and is brought about by the existence of a "wedge" between social
costs and private costs.
These costs are particularly easy to overlook for the very simple reason that
they are not perceived. The dominant aspect of the construction of more private
houses is the housing of more families, not the fact that if those resources had
been directed elsewhere jobs of a different type would be generated. The fact
that the ahernatives are not immediately visible should not detract fi’om
recugnising the real social cost of resources.
INTRODUCTION
If solely notions of efficient3’ were of concern tile only justification for
government interventiou would be to counter market failure, i.e., to help tile
market to function in its role of resource allocation in those instances where--
for reasons perhaps of externalities -- it is preveZnted from so doing. But this is
rarely the case. Few, ifany, societies have a minimalist role for government and
a feature of most is their stated concern with equality. A more equitable
distribution of economic wellbeing than that resulting fi’om tile interplay of
market forces and some given distribution of inherited position can be
motivated by a variety of reasons.
FIGURE I. I : Resource allocation in the housing market
h, h, quantity of
housing
One is that the ability to purchase goods and setwices and even to accumulate
human capital is heavily dependent upon social and economic background. In
such a situation it is argued that the further absence of equal access to education
implies that subsidies and taxes are necessary to attempt to redress the social
imbalances. Thus, for example, the subsidisation of housing for those at the
lower end of tile income distribution would, in this view, be a legitimate way of
moderating inequality.
A slightly different manner of rationalising redistribution is to take a
Rawlsian view of society. In such a context even equal access to education and
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capital markets would not be reasons for laissez-faire. Tile perception of the
distribution of individual abilities and position as being unknown would lead
individuals in an imaginary’ pre-materialisation to rationally formulate
maximum type redistribution rules.
Yet a further approach is to use non-indlvidualistic criteria. Rather than
formulating policy on tile basis of a social welfare function defined in terms of
the stun of the wellbeiug of individuals (which is the approach implicit in the
previous paragraphs where effectively different weights are assigned to different
individuals), society decides that certain goods should be available in minimum
quantities to all individuals. Such goods are referred to as "merit wanu" (Tobin
(1970)). Examples today are health care or free public transit for the aged.
Housing, likewise, could be defined as a merit good, perhaps because the
standard of health depends upon the qualit3’ of accommodation or that the
interests of children are ai stake.
In stun, there are a variety of reasons why the allocation of resources
resuhing from the functioning of the marketplace could be deemed to be less
than socially desirable- even if the marketplace were functioning efficiently in
the sense previously described.
Thus ihc formulation of housing policy must seek to balance the efficient
allocation of resources with considerations of equity. And in these
circumstances the economist cannot always say that a certain policy is "right"
or "wrong" or "inappropriate" without invoking some normative standard.
However, it will be argued in this study that in some instances the formulation
of policy would seem to have been undertaken in an environment in which such
trade-offs were not recognised. In this sense, as pointed out earlier in the
chapter, the provision of information and data defining the choices for policy
making is one of the study’s major objectives.
Fl’om this point the paper proceeds as follows. In the next chapter we review
the major trends in the ’seventies and examine the rate of return to housing, the
evoht6ou of the tax system, changes in housing quality and the general
behaviour of the market for private new houses. In Chapter 3 the cost of
ownership of a new house is examined with particular focus upon the role of
intlation, government incentive schemes and land. Chapter 4 deals with the
economelric literature on housing in Ireland. In Chapter 5 the functioning of
the whole market for housing is examined within a consistent framework. The
interrelationships between the key elements in the system (land, new houses,
secondhand houses and mortgages) are examined and some important
conclusions are drawn both for the role of price controls and tile direction iu
which future econonmtric work should go. In the final chapter the conclusions
of the various parts of the study are drawn together and some
recolnnleudatious are offered.
Chapter 2
AN OVERVIEW OF THE MARKET
In this chapter an overall view is presented of the new house market in the
’seventies. This involves two things: First, a presentation of information and an
examination of quality changes in new houses (Sections 2.I and 2.II). Second,
an analysis of the behavioural aspects of the housing market. Thus in Sections
2.111 through 2.IV the rate of return to housing is examined, the effects of the
income tax system are analysed and this is followed by a discussion of the
appropriate amount of housing to be supplied.
2.1 : Trends in the Seventies
In contrast to the 1960s housebuilding in the ’seventies expanded very rapidly
in tile early part of the decade and stayed at a plateau -- with some variations--
fi’om 1974 onwards. This plateau corresponded to a level of output about ta~’ice
that produced in the previous decade. As can be seen fi’om Table 2.1 the growth
in output has not always been smoothly increasing. The construction of Local
Authority (LA) houses expanded up to 1975 when a peak of almost 9,000 was
reached and then declined to a figure in the neighbourhood of 6,000 in 1978-
1980. Privately constructed houses, on the other hand, have not witnessed such
a contraction. After a significant growth in 1971 the output of private houses-
with the exception of a dip around 1976 -- has progressed from 9,201 in 1969 to
21,777 in 1980.
In terms of numbers’of houses built, output in the industry has thus
increased by about 100 per cent. In real value terms the increase has been
greater than this, as we shall argue in Section 2.1V that there have been
significant quality improvements in the industry. The increase in real output
has considerably outstripped the real growth rate in the economy as a whole.
The figures in Col. (v) of Table 2.1 indicate that real GNP growth over the same
period has been of the order of 44 per cent.
Accompanying the increase in the number ot houses built there has been a
steady increase in the price of new houses. Over the period the price of an
average new house rose from £4,625 to £27,538 -- an increase of 495 per cent.
The price is defined as the average for those houses which are financed by loans
from the major lending institutions. The Consumer Price Index on the other
hand rose by about 300 per cent.
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Table 2. I : Behoviour of kO’ variables in the "seventies
(i) (it) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Number of Number of Number of Average Percentage Index of Estimated
new private Local price change auerage populaZion
houses houses Authority of new in GNP at earnings in in
completed completed houses private constant transportable thousands
completed houses prices goods industries
(quarter 2)
1969 13,983 9,201 4,782 4,625 4.4% 97 2926
1970 13,887 10,120 3,767 5,270 2.3% 100 2950
1971 15,380 10,591 4,789 5,925 4.3% 107 2978
1972 21,572 15,670 5,902 6,497 5.2% 113 3024
1973 24,660 18,588 6,072 7,064 5.8% 122 3073
1974 26,256 19,510 6,746 8,534 2.7% 124 3124
1975 26,892 18,098 8,794 10,438 -1.1% 126 3177
1976 24,000 16,737 7,263 12,258 1.8% 126 3228
1977 24,548 18,215 6,333 14,770 4.8% 133 3272
1978 25,444 19,371 6,073 18,966 6.9% 144 3314
1979 26,544 20,330 6,214 23,144 3.9% 143 3363
1980 27,785 21.777 6,008 27,538 0.4% 144 3404*
*Mid point I)er,+.,een 1979 and 1981 Censuses.
’Source.l: (i) - (iv) Quarterly Bulletin of Housing Statistics.
(v) 1969 - 1979 National Income and Expetutiture 1980 ESR[ Quarterly Commentary, July 198 I.
(vi) Irish Stntistical Bitlletin.
The fact that a good, the quantity produced of which has risen to such an
extent, can experience a price increase of this magnitude indicates that very
strong influences have been at work in the market place to bring such price
changes about. While a detailed analysis of some of these influences (tax
regulations, quality change, government grants, inflation) is presented later, we
note just two factors at this point. The first refers to the growth in incomes. The
GNP index and the index of earnings in transportable goods industries in
Table 2. I indicate that purchasing power expanded considerably -- particularly
in the two phases 1971-1973 and 1977-1978. Scheffman and Slade (1981) have
argued that the growth in real income has played a major role in the demand
for housing in their study of house prices in Britain, Canada and the US. ID
addition to this, the demographic expansion of the ’seventies, which fat"
exceeded anything in recent history, meant that housing demand increased to
cater for the greater number of family units. The average annual population
growth in the ’sixties was about 16,000 (.05 per cent) while in the ’seventies it was
of lhe order of 46,000 (1.4 per cent). Accompanying the greater population in
the latter period was a greater tendenc3, for households to "undouble".
Blackwell (t981) estimates that, of the increase in the number of households
between 1971 and 1979, 35 per cent was due to an increase in headship rates,
though it must be recognised that such undoubling may not be independent of
the size of the housing stock and is certainly not independent of growth in
i DConles.
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2.II Odtality Changes in New Housing
In tile preceding section it was illustrated that a ver’y strong increase in house
prices was registered during the period under consideration. In this section we
start by examining tile available evidence on quality changes. From this two
questions emerge. The first concerns why the changes have taken place, the
second how quality changes can be quantified. A detailed treatment of the latter"
issue is to be found in Jennings (1983, a).
The major sources of information are the studies by Duff3, ( 1979, 1980) based
upon stu’vey data gathered by An Foras Forbartha for the year’s 1976, 1978, 1979,
1980 and planning permissions data published in the Irish Statistical Bulletin. The
hitter part of the ’seventies is characterised by more information than the early
part -- since both the Duffy studies and planning permissions data are
pertinent, whereas only the planning data are useful for the early part.
One of the important trends over the period has been a gradual movement
away from estate type houses towards single houses. Table 2.2 contains a
breakdown, by category, for 1976-1979. This trend is more attributable to
differential regional rates of growth in house building than to major changes ira
the ratio of single to estate type houses within regions (Duff’y, 1980, p. 4). For
example, the replacement of many farmhouses in the rural areas explain some
of this pattern as do changes in regional population and employment patterns.
Overall, the ’seventies seem to be characterised by two distinct phases: The
early years, up to 1974/75, when average housing size was falling and the
subsequent years when a much stronger counter trend materialised (see Figure
2.1). Data on approved planning applications (which do not always reflect
actual construction) indicate that average floor area decreased from 1,106
square feet ira 1970 to 1,062 square feet in 1974 (a decline of 4 per cent) and
increased to 1,214 square feet by 1979 (an increase of 14 per cent). Duff), (1980,
pp. 40/41) shows that this pattern for" the latter part of the period was similar for
both estate p,.’pe and single houses.
Table 2.2 Composition of housing output.
Catego~ 1976 1978 1979
I. Loc;ll Authol’it~ :lnd otllel"
Slate financed houses 7,398(31%) 6,127(24%) 6,239(29%)
2. Privzlte estate houses 10,320(43%) 11,170(44%) 10,323(39%)
3. Pl’iv:ue single houses 5,538(23%) 7,379(29%) 9,095(34%)
4. Private aparullents in new blocks 294(1%) 318(1%) 437(2%)
5. Conversions 450(2%) 450(2%) 450(2%)
Tola]s 24,000 25,444 26,544
-Source: Duty" (1980) p.2.
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FIGUI~ 2. I : Area of new private houses for which planning permission has been granted.
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Source: Irish Statistical Bulletin,
1980
More detailed inlbrmation on quality change (for which floor size may be
considered a good measure) is contained in Table 2.3 for the years 1976-1980. As
can be seen, a significant movement away from semi-detached to detached
structures was witnessed up to 1979 with some reversion in 1980. This is
consistent with the general direction of floor space.
Accompanying the shift towards larger single structures has been a general
improvement in the materials used in the design and finishing of new houses.
Cavity type walls were used to a much greater extent, particularly in estate
houses, in 1980 compared with 1976. The change in single houses has been
minimal. Complementing this has been an increase in the amount of brickwork
and stonework in the finish. The percentage of new houses not equipped with
central heating has dropped fi’om 43 per cent to 7 per cent for estate houses.
The l)ercentage of houses with some type of insulation in the roofs, floors and
external walls is shown in Table 2.3. Here again the quality of insulation has
improved substantially. Much of this trend towards better insulated houses was
as a resuh of government legislation, though a considerable move towards
insulating roofs in particular was made in the mid-seventies as a result of the
energy’ crisis.
There are several reasons for the ii’nprovement of the interior finishing. With
the increase in the rate of female participation in the labour force it is ever more
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Table 2.3 : Characteristics composition of housing
Estate houses Single houses
1976 1978 1979 1980 1976 1980
Size
100 sq. m. 74% 37% 32% 38% 38% 21%
100-140 sq. m. 20% 52% 54% 52% 50% 66%
140 sq. m. 0% 11% 13% 10% 6% 13%
Average floor size 95 sq. m. 114 sq. m. 114 sq. m. 111 sq. m. 106sq. m. 121 sq. m.
Percentage change in floor
size +19% 0% -3% +14%
SlTUcture
Detatched 6% 32% 32% 23% other 12% 14%
Semi-detatched 82% 58% 58% 72%
Terraced 8% 5% 4% 2%
Bungalows 4% 5% 8% 4% 88% 86%
l’Val/.~
Hollow blocks 225 ram. 88% 74% 68% 58% 2% 1%
Cavity 275 mm. 14% 20% 30% 42% 9$% 97%
Other
- 2% - 3% 2%
Wardrobes
Average per house 1.0 2.1 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.4
Central Heating
Percentage of houses
with central heating 57% 93% 93% 93% n.a. n.a.
Insulation
Roofs 78% 91% 92% 99%
Floors 4% 17% 58% 89% n.a. n.a.
External walls 1% 3% 16% 66%
Source: Duff)’ (1980) Appendices.
the case that a higher percentage of first time buyer couples are both working
and hence have both higher incomes and less time to work at finishing a new
house. Their opportunit7 cost is high. Additionally (i) the costs associated with
better finishing of a house are part of a mortgage and payments can thus be
spread over, say, 25 years which is a more attractive prospect than paying for
such expenscs out of current income and (ii) if purchased retail, house fittings
are subject to a higher rate of value added tax than if installed by builders. It
must, however, he recognised that in explaining the change in qualitT, the major
influence has likely come fi’om the two income family rather than the additional
rL’asons, sil3cc the l]]ajor change has conae in the former.
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I n brief, there has been a great cllange in the type of houses which have been
built in the ’seventies. The trend in the early years was towards smaller houses
wi~ereas in the later years it was towards larger, more completely finished
houses, using better materials. It is thus unreasonable to suppose that average
house prices recbrded over that Ome are purely a measure of price change.
(One of the corollaries of this is that the relationship between house prices and
building costs must be interpreted with care. In particular, the fact that
published figures indicate that costs and prices have changed at different rates
must not be construed to mean that profit margins have changed radically in
house building. See Figure 2.2).
Consider now what reasons may have been responsible for the shift in
quality. In the first place it is obvious that all of the factors which are
responsible for generating an increased demand for house numbers -- i.e.,
govertmaent incentives, inflation, income’ growth, etc. -- are likewise
responsible for generating a demand for large and better houses. Some
additional factors relating to supply conditions have apparently also been at
work h o’~vever.
The small decline in housing size in the early ’seventies may be attributable to
the type of grant structure which came into existence with the 1970 Housing Act.
Previousb.’ grants had been payable on the basis of the number of rooms in the
house. With the new regulations the largest grants were given for houses with a
floor area between 75 and 100 square metres (807-1,076 square feet) and no
grants were payable for house sizes above 1,249 square feet. The grants
receivable fi’om the then Department of Local Government were paid directly to the
builder with a supplementary grant from the Local Authorit3, payable to the
purchaser. With Ihe replacement of this system in 1977 by the single lump sum
grant of £ 1,000 payable to the buyer and the accompanying relaxation of floor
size requiremems there was no longer the incentive to build houses in the 75- 100
square illetre range.
Of particular interest in the 1970-1975 period is why uouse sizes remained
low despite the surge in incomes in the 1971/73 period. The explanation for this
would seem to lie in the pattern of building site development at that time and
the role of mortgage availability. With a greater tenden~, for builders to lay
foundations for a complete development and finish the building process
gradually, a given stimulus to build particular sized houses would have a longer
lasting effect than in a situation such as existed in the late ’seventies, when
working capital was more expensive and the tendenc3’ was for sites to be
completed in blocks. Coupled with this was the general shortage of mortgage
funds in 1974 which postponed the sale of some houses until the following year.
The changes in the grant allocation regulations in 1977, under which only
first time buyers qualified, also meant that there was no longer an incentive for
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second time buyers to be constrained in their choice of size of house.
The abolition of property taxes ("rates") on residential housing effective
fi’om January 1978, meant that yet another check on house size was lifted. Prior
to this owners of new houses below 1,250 square feet were subject to rates on a
sliding scale whereas owners of houses above this were subject to full taxation.
For the former one-tenth of the full amount was payable in the first year of
ownership two-tenths in the second year, etc., until year 10 when the full
amount was payable. With the abolition of rates the incentive generated by the
differential treatment of different sized houses no longer existed.
Quite apart from these specific changes, the general incentives for more
households to purchase housing (such as inflation induced capital gains,
favourable tax treatment, higher real incoz’nes, etc., which will be discussed in
later chapters) equally were incentives for individual households to purchase
larger sized houses.
The effect of all of these changes together likely meant that there was an
imbalance in the desired stock as between large and small house --.and their
imbalance would have required more than just one year to redress given that
the flow of new houses is such a small percentage of total stock.
The change to larger sized houses in the second half of the decade was
motivated additionally by supply side reasons.
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When a change in consumer preferences induces a movement towards a
product which differs from what was formerly being consumed suppliers will
generally respond -- perhaps with a lag, or with the inducement of a change in
relative prices -- to this type of shift. In this sense the demand considerations
are sufficient to explain tile movement towards larger, higher quality housing
in the mid/late-seventies. But, though less easy to quantify, there have been
reasons for the suppliers likewise to prefer the emerging demand pattern.
Relative to the latter part of the decade, builders of estate type houses in the
early ’seventies were geared to building relatively larger numbers of low cost
housing. Profits were perceived to depend upon fast turnover or low holding
costs. During the period 1967168 - 1973174 the total number of houses
completed rose from 12,017 to 25,365. This expansion meant that the building
industry was geared to a much higher rate of production at the end of the
period than at the beginning, and when d~e slowdown in the effective demand
for houses materialised in 1974176 due to the general slowdown in economic
activity, builders were forced to hold larger than customary stocks of unsold
houses.
The demand slowdown was compounded by a shortage of mortgage funds
from thc major [ending institutions. In 1974 the government advised the
building societies to concentrate their loans upon new house purchases. This
had unfortunate effects on both the secondhand and new markets. With
secondhand houses more difficuh to sell, many purchases of new houses by
existing owners, condhiona] upon the sale of their previous house, did not
materia]ise. With the recognition of the impossibility of separating the markets
for new and secondhand houses the government requirement was rescinded.
This slowdown, after a period of great expansion, in conjunction with higher
interest rates, led to a preference for smaller stockholding by builders. This in
turn implied that a certain naovelnent to larger houses in smaller numbers with
a switch from estate type to one-off’type houses was seen by some builders as a
way of avoiding risk without an undue fall in profits. This period also witnessed
a tendencv for larger builders to concentrate upon site development and then
sell the sites to smaller builders for construction.
In subsequent ),ears it is arguable that the spread of Certificates of
Reasonable Value (CRV) Scheme caused some shifts in the market. The
certificates were introduced in an effort to control the price of new houses and
the reqtfirement of a certificate has gradually expanded to one in which (at the
time of writing) ahnost all new mortgage financed houses require a CRV or
equivalent exemption certificate (details are contained in the notes in various
issues of the Q~tarterly Bulletin of Housing Statistics, (O,.BHS)).
Considerable dispute exists regarding the effects of this scheme. On the one
hand, it is proposed by the Department of the Environment (1981, p. 29) that
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considerable savings to housebuyers have resulted from the effective roll-back
of prices requested by builders for new houses. For example, a total of 3,122
certificates for 11,626 dwellings were issued in 1980 and price reductions were
effected on 1,464 houses. The amount the buyers were "saved" amounted thus
to £3.9 million. (Of course it can be argued that such a notion of saving is
meaningless. For example, if builders had applied for £5m more the "savings"
would have been £8.9m). In addition 6,904 Certificates of Exemption (CE) were
issued. A different view of CRVs has been expressed by M. Greene (The Irish
Times, 7 June 1980). He argued that delays in obtaining certificates are costly
and that many contractors switched to the upper end of the market to avoid the
administrative work associated with obtaining the Certificate.
There is a dilemma here for the policy maker. On the one hand, the plethora
of incentive schemes in existence - which are part of the philosophy of
encouraging home ownership - certainly increases demand (and her~ce prices),
while, on the other hand, schemes such as the CRV are intended to dampen the
tendency for prices to increase.
When making an assessment of schemes such as the CRV it is essential to
distinguish between two notions of cost - a distinction which was not wholly
recognised in the above referenced views. When the Department of the
Environment (DOE) refers to a reduction in prices of£3.9 million it is referring
to a redistribution of purchasing power within the economy, not to a net saving of
society’s resources. Greene’s argument, on the other hand, refers to real net
social losses as a result of increased working capital requirements, an increased
amount of resources devoted to implementing the scheme and a redirection of
resources within the indust~’. While a loss in real resources in return for a more
equitable distribution of wealth may be desirable, it would seem that, in this
instance, not only has such a balance not been examined, but the trade offmay
not have been recognised.
It will be argued in Chapter 5 and in the conclusion of this paper that the
design of the Certificate of Reasonable Value scheme and the functioning of the
housing market is such that price controls can only be effective in the short run
and that in the long run the scheme has negligible effects as far as controlling
prices is concerned. Furthermore, the general philosophy behind the
implementation of price control schemes in an industry which is characterised
by low concentration, considerable competition among builders, and relative
freedom from entry barriers, warrants elaboration. While intetweution in
markets may be desirable on account of incomplete information or capital
market imperfections, it would seem that intervention via CRVs has been
motivated, not by these considerations, but out of a belief that such
intervention can permanently affect the level of prices.
The remaining issue of importance from the standpoint of quality change is
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the construction of an index which can be utilised to correct the price index of
all new houses. A reasonable way of doing this is to examine the change in
house size over the period and let this serve as a proxy for quality. This is
reasonable to the extent that the price of housing is a proportionate function of
size. (It is not being proposed here that prices are determined by ~:osts plus
mark-up rather than in a supply-demand framework; only that within the
housing market at any given time different sized houses will command different
prices). While there is evidence that an increase in floor area alone does not
increase costs on a one to one basis (jennings (1983,a)) the fact that bigger
houses require more fixtures and finishing implies that, in practice, an increase
in size brings about an approximately equal proportionate increase in cost-
which is paid for by the purchaser.
Tile quarterly index of size for planning approvals can thus be used as a
quality index, subject to some adjustment. The adjustment is made necessary
because of the fact that plans approved in one quarter will not result in houses
until several quarters later and it is the later quarter for which the house price
index is defined. Kenneally and McCarthy (1982) suggest that the median lag
between starts and completions is five quarters. Assuming that another quarter
lag exists between approval and starts a moving average of floor size of houses
for which planning permission has been granted, centred six quarters back,
thus sem,es as a quality correction index. The resulting quality corrected real
price index is g!ven in Figure 2.3.
The information contained in Figure 2.3 underlines very much the
conclusions which were arrived at by Duff3’ (1980), whose data -- though
limited time wise -- are more reliable. The data points are annualised averages
of the quarterly figures obtained from the Quarterly Bulletin of Housing Statistics
deflated by the Consumer Price Index and standardised by the planning
approvals index. It is clear that the uncorrected data considerably overstate the
degree to which house prices have been rising. Any statistical analysis of the
housing market which examines the behaviour of prices must thus be
cogniscent of this.
As a final word on the housing quality issue it must be recognised that quality
has here been defined only in terms of the structural characteristics of housing
and not in terms of environmental characteristics. For example, the growth in
urban areas (particularly Dublin) has meant that new houses tend to be further
from the central business district and this involves greater daily commuting
time to and from work. Thus, the indices which have been presented should not
be interpreted as all-encompassing hedonic indices. (See jennings, (1983, a).)
This concludes the discussion of the basic trends in the housing market in the
’seventies. In the following sections attention is focused upon the behavioural
aslSects of the participants in the housing market.
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2.111 The Rate of Return to Investments
An understanding of the forces which determine asset prices in the spectrum
of markets is important because it facilitates a recognition of why certain
patterns emerge in these markets. It is also important because it casts incentive
formation in a behavioural as opposed to an accounting framework. An
example of this is the following. The increase in land prices which has
accompanied the increase in housing prices, if viewed in an account framework,
would indicate that land prices have caused the increase in house prices-- since
land is an input into the production of houses. A behavioural view would
recognise that the demand for land is a derived demand, dependent upon the
market for the final good. Schemes designed to moderate rising house prices
could thus either take the extremely different forms ofsubsidising the owners of
land or abolishing the subsidies to house purchasers, depending upon the
approach adopted.
A general theo~, of asset pricing rests upon recognising that investors seek to
maximise their post tax real returns. Consequently, when disequilibria occur or
when innovations take place in markets a reallocation of resources follows such
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that returns tend to be equalised. This tenden~, is made possible through
variation in asset prices. To illus’trate this consider the simple two sector model
developed by Harberger (1964) illustrated in Figure 2.4.
In equilibrium the return in each sector (abstracting from risk premia) is
given by r0 with the resources KS and Kb invested in each. The schedules A and B
define the (diminishing) returns to different amounts of capital invested in each
sector. Say now that the rate of return in sector b increases as a result of some
government incentive. The rate of return schedule thus increases from B to B L
With only Kb invested in this sector the private returns in sector B exceed those
in sector A. Resources are thus shifted to the sector with the highest returns
until the post tax returns are once again equalised at rv In Figure 2.4 resources
to the amount of K, Ka t have been moved to sector B.
The similarity between this and the mechanism described in Section I.ll
should be apparent. Investors reallocate resources so as to maximise private
returns. But in this example the social returns available on investment not
unclertaken in sector A exceed those on the marginal investments actually
undertaken in sector B.
What is meant by capital invested ? This capital allocatioll can refer either to a
physical movement of resources from one sector to another or, in the case of
fixed capital, to a change in the value of the resources tied up in the different
sectors. If this model is interpreted in terms of capital invested in housing
(sector B) and capital invested elsewhere (sector A the mechanism which
equalibrates post tax returns in the economy requires that, since accretions to
the physical stock take place very slowly (the rate is about 2+ per cent per annum
at present), measures which benefit all owners of housing (for example, tile
abolition of property taxes) will be capitalised in theprice of the house. Does this
then mean that measures which increase the return on new houses will affect
onty the amount of physical resources allocated to them and not their price?
Clearly not, since such measures will induce a switch in demand away fi’om
secondhand to new houses where the return is now higher, the price of new
houses will be bid up until a uniform return again obtains. In the long run the
allocation of real resources between the sectors will depend upon the price
elastici~, of supply of land if other factors are supplied perfectly elastically. If
higher house prices become capitalised in higher land prices there will be no
tendency for more real resources to drive down tile rate of return o11 housing,
whereas with an elastic supply curx,e of land an increased amount of real
resources will be so directed. (Throughout the text it is assumed that long-run
supply elasticities exceed the short-run elasticities in the housing sector but that
supplies are not infinitely elastic (see White and White (1977)). How inelastic
supplies are in tile short run obviously depends upon the length of the time
period so defined).
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FZGURE 2.4: Capital allocation in a two sector economy
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To return to the original question posed at the start of this section: It is
important to distinguish between accounting and theoretical approaches to
pricing mechanisms. Rising prices cannot ultimately be countered in a market
context by. subsidisation to purchasers. The effects of subsidisation, while
perhaps decreasing the net cost of purchase, are to increase the gross price of
the product benefiting from the subsidy, with the exact degree of such an
increase depending upon the supply elasticity.
2.IV Income Taxation and the Demand for Housing
The system of income taxation in Ireland, under which, for the period in
question, almost all mortgage interest payments have been deductible in
computing taxable income, is widely believed to be a strong incentive to
purchase housing. This is particularly true for the non-agricultural sector
where the incidence of income tax is highest. With growing inflation in the
’seventies and limited de facto indexation of the income tax schedule,
households have been pushed into higher marginal tax brackets as a result of
increases in income which, in many cases, were no more than the rate of
inflation. (This aspect of the income tax schedule has been documented by
Dowling (19"/7), and Hughes (1982)). Thus, one way of having a lower marginal
tax rate (i.e., a higher real income) has been to increase the amount of interest
payments on a mortgage.
In this section the notion that mortgage interest deductibility has been a
reason for stimulating house purchase is examined. In the following chapter
(which deals with the various aspects of the cost of housing) evidence is presented
on the degree to which potential house purchasers have faced an increasing
marginal tax rate over the period in question. While ’the results of the latter
substantiate the belief that increasing marginal income tax rates have
materialised, it will be argued here that the view, that this reason for more
housing investment, does not stand up under close examination.
The argument embodied in the conventional wisdom briefly outlined above
has very limited validity once it is recognised that, until 1982, there was
effectively no distinction in the income tax code between interest deductibility
for house investment purposes and any other type of investment. Indeed
interest payments incurred to finance consumption expenditures were equally
deductible. Hence, there has ostensibly been nothing in the income tax
treatment of mortgage interest to encourage investment in housing over any
other type of expenditure. Why then has the belief grown up that housing
investment has been given special status in the tax system?
A m~.jor reason for the tax induced expenditure on housing has been the
non-taxation of imputed income which accrues to homeowners. Investments in
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bonds or stocks, for example, yield an income stream which is taxable whereas
the consumption ofshelter (imputed income) is almost completely tax free since
the abolition of rates in 1978. Investment in housing has been the major
" method of avoiding double taxation of savings in this period.
A second reason why housing, rather than other forms of investment, should
be encouraged relates to the degree of perfection of the capital market. Not all
investments are equally attractive forms of collateral. Summers (1980, p. 430)
points out:
Tile fact that mortgage debt is the principal or only financial liability of many
households suggest that housing investments are easier to borrow against than
other ahernatives. This may be because of their risk characteristics or of
institutional constraints.
This is a key constraint. While in some instances stocks can be used as collateral
for borrowing to invest in them they are a less attractive collateral than a house
from the financial intermediary’s, standpoint due to their greater short-term
variabilip,- in price. For example, what would the optimal policy be for a lender
if the leverage of the borrower/investor goes to infinity (equity goes to zero) due
to a pf’ice fall in the stock ? Variation in house prices is rarely sufficient to reduce
the owners equity to zero due to the down payment requirements (which vary
with the state of both the housing and mortgage markets). Likewise, institutions
exist in Ireland (building societies) which have the specific goal of investing in
housing. Their rapid sustained growth has enabled them to become the largest
single source of housing finance. If the structure of the financial system were
different the structure of loans would likely be different.
Third, the tax system has had an effect on housing investment through its
treatment of building societies. Mortgage rates tend to be lower than rates
charged to potential investors in stocks. This is due to the higher post tax
returns which depositors in building societies can obtain (even though the
nominal return may be lower than from other forms of liquid asset investments)
because of the relatively favourable tax treatment of building societies. By being
able to attract funds at a lower rate than most institutions they can
correspondingly lend at a lower rate. (At various times some other institutions
have also benefited from the non-taxation of interest paid upon small deposits
-- for example the Post Office).
Fourth, the non-taxation of capital gains on housing has set it apart fi’om
other assets.-
It has also been argued (see Feldstein and Poterba (1980) for example) that
the tax system is not neutral in its effect on portfolio make-up’when the rate of
inflation varies. Because of the use of historic rather than replacement
depreciation allowances and the treatment of inventories the effective rate of
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corporate taxation rises with inflation. Feldstein and Poterba have argued that,
in the United States, the effective rate of corporate taxation rose from 55 per
cent in 1965 to 75 per cent in 1979. With post tax returns changing asset prices
will respond. However, with the effective instantaneous write off allowances on
corporate investment in Ireland this has not been a factor over the period.
It has further been frequently suggested that, in times of inflation, investors
prefer a physical rather than a paper asset and hence the demand for housing
has increased relative to the demand for stocks. But this claim has only apparent
meaning since stocks do represent a claim on physical capital. The real question
concerns why Tobin’s "q" might fall in times of inflation. (Tobin’s "q" is the
ratio of the market valuation of assets to their replacement cost.) The only
validity to this type of argument is that in time of uncertainty investors prefer a
real asset to one which has a return denominated in fixed terms.
- In conclusion, ~,~,ehavear-gue-d-here that interest deductibility for income tax
payments is not, per se, and contrary to popular belief, the reason why investors
have found housing to be such a desirable asset. The taxation system, in various
ways has favoured house purchase. Housing has become a desirable asset for
reasons of non-taxation of imputed rent and capital gains, inflation, suitable
collateral and differemlal tax treatment of the financial institutions which
supply funds to potential investors. If it is deemed desirable to influence
investment behaviour in different assets it must be recognised that these are the
factors in the current institutional set up which have generated the high returns
to housing and that, while interest deductibility engenders high returns to
housing, it is not sufficient to guarantee such returns.
2.V Space Invaders and the Optimal Amount of Housing
One of the most important aspects of housing policy -- and one which has
received little attention -- concerns whether or not there exists a structure
which promotes the efficient use of space. For example, do policies exist which
enable households to consume the amount of housing services they desire at
given prices or do policies exist which encourage households to live in houses
which are too small or too large?
A clear distinction needs to be made between two concepts of need. The first
is one which is defined in a strongly normative sense. For example, it might be
decided that a desirable allocation of housing in the economy is one in which
space is distributed such that each person should have 1.5 rooms or400 square
feet of living space or some such allocation. With such a norm a set of policies
which would resuh in a small variance around this goal would be superior to
one which yielded a larger variance. A second concept is one according to
which, given the distribution of income, policies would be defined as fulfilling
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needs if they facilitated the consumption of the desired amount of housing.
Such a goal would likely irnply that policies would be efficient if high income
families have bigger houses than low income families given that housing has a
positive income elasticity of demand. In essence such "policies" would consist
of little intervention other than to eliminate market imperfections.
(a) Financial Issues
The evolution of events in the ’seventies has been such as to provide
incentives to households to hold larger mortgages. Many observers have
(incorrectly) equated this with the notion of "trading up".
Consider a family which has paid offmuch of its mortgage and wishes to avail
of greater interest deductions on its income tax payments. This it could do, in
theory, by moving to a different house of exactly the same size and price, divert
some of the equity from the previous house to another purpose, thereby taking
a larger mortgage on the new property and benefit from the interest relief. All
without gearing up to a larger house. In this way, a family could continually
take advantage of almost the full deduction without ever purchasing a larger
house if the family were willing to move with sufficient frequency. But if this is
so why has it been argued that the search for greater income tax deductions, in
the form of mortgage interest relief, has led to a demand for bigger houses as
opposed to different houses with a higher mortgage?
In addition to the reasons already discussed in the text as to why individuals
move "vertically rather than laterally (i.e., expected capital gains, income
growth, mortgage interest deduction, etc.) the following institutional
considerations are inaportant. In the first place, the "siphoning" of mortgage
funds to non-invesunent purposes would seem to be minimal in Ireland.
Evidence exists for the US that substantial amounts of money designed to
finance housing have found their way to other destinations. This is done simply,
as described above, by not reinvesting all of the equity from an existing house in
a new house. Dowries (1980) points out that, in the US in 1979, studies show
that, on average, one-third of existing equity was not directed towards
investment in the new house, almost one*third of families shifted half their
equity to some other purpose and over 80 per cent of families moved some
equity out of housing. This behaviour is perfectly reasonable as far as the
individual investor is concerned. He is rationally acting to minimise tax
payments. However, the result of the government’s policy of mortgage interest
tax relief in these cases is the simple subsidy of consumption. It is thus
interesting to find in Ireland that one of the effects of the nature of the supply of
mortgage funds -- in a market which has been characterised by occasionally
negative real interest rates and consequent rationing -- if such siphoning does
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not seem to occur on a substantial scale due to the sometimes limited funds
available and the consequent tendency for the building societies to require that
all existing equity be applied to the purchase of the subsequent house. In a
afore competitive market with positive real interest rates financial institutions
would be willing to lead to any applicants with sufficient collateral.
While it might be thought that the provisions of’the Irish income tax laws --
which until recently have permitted all interest deductions irrespective of the
purpose of borrowing (unlike the US) -- would obviate the need to siphon
funds in such a way, the important aspect of the ability to make large tax
allowable borrowing is the role played by collateral. It is this role which
housing can fulfil in the financial market.
Incentives to gear up have, furthermore, not been limited to the role played
by the income ULX schedule. The consequent greater leverage, for example,
brings about greater capital gains or losses on a fixed investment. But it should
be recognised that the higher marginal tax rates per se have 0nly encouraged
greater indebtedness and not caused the gearing up to large houses. The
accompanying move to larger dwellings (apart from being motivated by
expectations of greater capital gains) has been due to the nature of the supply of"
funds in the market place and to the desire for higher quality housing which the
generally rising real incomes in the ’seventies have brought about.
In the second instance there are transactions costs associated with moving.
Since these costs are high in Ireland, due to stamp duty and fees, more than just
occasional moves are discouraged. Baker and O’Brien (1979, p. 64) and Wall
(1984) illustrate that the costs of moving can easily exceed ten per cent of the
value of a house. Hence, a family considering a move has not simply an
incentive to take advantage of the full interest deduction and no more, but to
purchase a house which will require interest payments in the early years greater
than the maximum permissible for the tax deduction. Some interest deductions
can rationally be forgone in the early years of a mortgage, not simply because
the interest deductions will be greater in succeeding years than if a smaller
house had been purchased, but because the larger house, qua consumption
good, yields greater utility to the owner than a smaller house and, in addition,
the owner can hope that the interest deduction allowance will be increased with
inflation in the following years (as has happened periodically since 1974). A
corollas! of this institutional framework, in which tax incentives are balanced
by moving costs, is that owners should circumvent the high transactions costs
associated with moving by simply making mortgage financed physical additions
to their existing house.
(b) Demographic Issues
One way of viewing the demographic consequences of high investment levels
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in housing is to examine the distribution of space per number of persons
housed.
The percentage of house buyers made up of single person households has
increased in recent 5~ears. Data are available only from 19"/7 (see "Housing Loan
Statistics" DOE, 1981) but indicate that the percentage of mortgage borrowers
made up of single individuals (whose intention is to marry, or otherwise) has
risen from 38.5 per cent to 42 per cent over the period 197"/-1980. In the Dublin
area the change has been from 38.7 per cent to 47.2 per cent. This is a more
informative statistic, investment wise, since it effectively excludes agriculturally
based buyers who in the past, by not paying income tax, have had less to gain by
investing. While this time period is too short to enable general inferences to be
made, a possible implication of the increasing proportion of single individuals
investing in housing is that the market may be allocating living space in a high
variance manner.
This interpretation, however, might be incorrect since it is not known
whether a high or low proportion of unmarried new house buyers actually
occupy the dwelling. Paradoxically, a large scale purchase of new housing by
single people and subsequent letting to larger family units can lead to a very
emcient use of space -- conceivably more efficient than if those houses were
occupied by two person married couples.
But even the consideration itself of policies designed to more fully utilise the
housing stock begs normative questions. In particular, if family size is treated as
exogenous then it would probably be deemed socially desirable that more space
be allocated to larger families, whereas if family size is treated as a matter of
choice this would not follow. Ultimately it is consideration of the (choiceless)
offspring which dictates more favourable treatment to larger families.
While current policies on space allocation are primarily directed at the flow
of new housing (for example, until recently the grant structure has been
directed primarily at the married rather than the unmarried), given that annual
accretions are small relative to the stock it would be fruitful to examine how the
existing stock might be better utilised.
Typically, the amount of space required varies over the life cycle and thus if
the transactions costs associated with moving could be reduced there would be
greater incentives for the existing stock to be held by households in a way which
corresponds to their tastes and needs. This is an area of housing policy which
requires much more attention than has previously been devoted to it. The
simultaneous existence of overcrowding arid underoccupation reflects a very
wasteful use of the stock of housing. While it is unrealistic to believe that older
families would universally be interested in moving to smaller dwellings at the
"empty. nest" stage of the life cycle (social ties are frequently too strong to
facilitate this) lower transactions costs would be one way of providing an
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economic incentive to those who would wish to make such a change but are
deterred because of the financial costs in the form of legal fees, estate agent’s
fees and stamp duty.
An important corollary of this is that the historic goal of high rates of
homeownership has perhaps been pursued beyond an optimal point. With
almost eve~’ conceivable policy directed to ownership at the expense of the
development of a rental sector, the mobility of the population has been
curtailed very greatly. This has rneant that, rather than occupying rented
acconlmodation at the early and late stages of the life cycle- as more typically
occurs in economies with lower rates of ownership -- households tend to use
the existing stock of housing very inefficiently.
The pattern of externalities which has resulted from this should not be
viewed as mit3or or academic. The concentration upon new houses, at the
expense of rental accommodation and maintenance of the existing stock, has
brought about a pattern of urban sprawl, particularly in the Dublin area, with
all of the expected consequences (i.e., high transportation costs, urban
congestion, elc.). Again, it must be recognised that, even in the absence of the
system of new house purchase incentives, the demographic and income growth
in the ’seventies would have acted as to bring about a similar pattern of
development in any case. But policies geared toward the prevention of urban
decay and a recognition of the value of a well developed rental sector would
certainly improve the utilisation of existing space and bring about a more
desirable pattern of developlnent.
Chapter 3
THE COST OF CAPITAL AND THE COST OF HOUSING
3.1: Introduction
Tile rising price of houses has in the past led to a considerable degree of
concern on the part of almost all governments over the ability of families to
afford housing. The consequences of such concern have come in the form of
incentives to buy, and subsidies for, housing. What has been notably absent in
this process is a clear formulation ofexactly what the cost ofcapital has been for
purchasers. Emphasis has frequently been upon, for example, the mortgage
rate to be paid by investors or grants to be received, to the exclusion of
considerations such as capital gains or imputed income.
Tile purpose of this chapter is to fill this informational gap by developing a
numerical cost of capital series for the period 1970-1980. It is boped that this
will have two effects. First, that policies which are geared to helping potential
home owners will take account of the overall picture of costs and subsidies and
that, as a consequence, policies could be adopted with a fuller understanding of
their likely consequences. The second hope is that such a data series might, in
tile future, facilitate the efforts of econometricians in their examination of the
qualitative and quantitative channels of influence in the housing market. It will
be argued in Chapter 4 that data deficiencies have been one of the reasons why
econometricians have not, to date, been able to build successful models of the
new housing market, and the sooner that such models can be built the more
reliable can decision making be made.
Two notions of the cost of capital must be distinguished. The first is an ex-post
concept defining what the cost has been in a certain period, the second defines
what potential buyers estimate it will be in future periods. The difference arises
because not all values eni.ering the cost of capital are known a priori. For
example, capital gains can only be estimated for future periods but the actual
values are known for past periods. In econometric modelling the expected cost
is what determines the purchase decision.
In Section II of this chapter we focus upon the role which the income tax
system has played in the ’seventies. Section I I I of the chapter deals with how the
cost of capital can be measured and some estimates of the cost of capital are
presented in Section IV.
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3.II Gross and Net Costs -- The Effects of the Tax System
When considering an investment, the returns to which are affected by the
taxation system, an investor will examine the post tax returns in order to
determine whether or not the investment is profitable. In the same fashion,
when investing in housing, a potential purchaser recognises that, not only are
the returns to such an investment untaxed, but that, for the most part, the
interest payments made on borrowings to purchase the house are deductible
from taxable income when computing tax payments. Clearly, the higher the
marginal tax rate faced by an individual the greater is the value of such
deductions which the income tax system permits. It is widely believed that the
marginal tax rate which typical potential house buyers have faced in the
’seventies has increased and that this has acted as a stimulus to house purchase.
In this section estimates of such tax rates are presented. The purpose of this is
(a) to provide somewhat more exact figures than those typically used in the
discussion of the role of the tax system, and (b) so that a net cost of capital series
can be developed for the period.
The exact measurement of the evolution of marginal tax rates for house
buyers is difficult due to the paucity of data. However, the general trend in this
can be gauged by examining the changes in rates, allowances and bands for the
period. Information on this -- based upon the pattern of average industrial
wages and the Consumer Price Index -- is given in Table 3.1. It is clear that,
despite changes in personal allowances, the tax brackets have changed rather
little since the introduction of the integrated income tax system in 1974. With
nominal incomes increasing by about a factor of 2.7, many households have
been paying inflation induced higher rates in the late ’seventies. (These effective
tax rates slightly underestimate the change due to the omission of the Pay
Related Social Insurance (PRSI) contributions from 1979 onwards. But these
are neglected here since they are levied on gross incomes and cannot thus be
reduced by obtaining greater tax allowances - through, for example, mortgage
interest deductions.)
The most striking aspect of the tax brackets has been the large width of the
standard rate band relative to the steep progressivity in the rate encountered
above a taxable income of about £4,500. In this regard it should be noted that
the effective marginal rate has not increased for most households earning the
average male industrial wage, since the taxable income of this group has
remained in the wide standard rate band. Nor apparently has the average rate
payable by all taxpayers been increasing. But this is due to the fact that, as some
taxpayers move to higher bahds, more taxpayers are being brought into the net
at the lower rates. (The consequence of more tax payers entering the tax net at
the lower end means that the tax rates on household income may increase even
though the tax rate of the average tax payer has not.)
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Of course, the issue of interest is not the behaviour of the tax rate of the
typical industrial worker but rather the tax rate of the typical house buyer.
While sumcient data are not available to establish this exactly data have recently
been published by the Department of the Environment (DOE) which make
estimates possible. Table 3.2 contains information on the annual average of the
quarterly income distribution of new house purchasing mortgage recipients.
The source of this is "Housing Loan Statistics 1977-1980" (DO E ( 1981 )). If the
brackets were not open ended a mean income.could be estimated, though, as
ah’eady argued, even a mean income level would not be sufficient to indicate the
average of the marginal tax rates payable by house purchasers - because the
mean of tile marginal rates is not the same as the marginal rate for tile mean
unit. What is really required is the income distribution of the house buyers over
a period. Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 indicate that the latent distribution is skewed to
the right and might be approximated by the Iognormal or loglogistic - a
reasonable hypothesis where income distribution figures are concerned..
Accordingly, by estimating the parameters of the underlying distribution and
assuming that only its position (rather than form) changes over time an income
distribution for house purchasers can be estimated quite straightforwardly as
follows.
For computational simplicity we assume that the distribution is Ioglogistic in
income. The distribution function is given by
F(x) = exp (ct + 13x)/{1 + exp (a + 13x)} (3.1)
where x is the logarithm of the income brackets. By estimating the parameters ct
and 13 from the regression
Iog(pl/(l - Pi)l =ct + 13xi + ei (3.2)
where ei is a well behaved error term and Pl is F (xi) for the years 1978, 1979 and
1980 the moments of the underlying distribution can be obtained. The mean
and standard deviation of the logistic distribution are ~ = - a/13 and ~s =
a/ 4~ (see Cox (1969), p.101). Recognising additionally that the logistic and
normal distributions are almost identical numerically (see Cox (1969) p. 28) the
mean of the income distribution is given approximately by exp (!a + .~.~2) (see
Theil (1971) p. 75).
The results of this estimation indicate considerable stability for the three
years for which data are available. Having estimated Equation (3.2) for each of
the 3 years the parameter estimates yield predicted mean incomes of £5,293,
£5,994 and £7,023. These are, respectively, 1.19, 1.22 and 1.20 times the average
industrial earnings for males (see Table 3.2). In addition, the coefficients of
variation for the logistic distributionare 0.050, 0.048 and 0.050. In light of these
findings it is not unreasonable to assume that the coefficient of variation for the
log of the income distribution is constant over the period and that the mean of
Table 3.1: Rates on taxable income 1974-1981
1974/1975    1975, April 1975,June(a) 1976/1977     1977/1978 1978/1979    1979/1980    1980/1981(c)
26% 1,550 26% 1,550 26% 1,550 26% <1,550 20% <500 20% 500
35% 4,350 35% 4,350 38.5% 4,350 38.5% 4,350 25% 1,500 25% 1,500 25% <1,100 25% <1,000
50% 6,350 45% 6,350 49.5% 6,350 49.5% 6,350 35% 4,500 35% 4,500 35% 4,100 35% 5,000
65% 8,350 55% 8,350 60.5% 8,350 60.5% 8,350 45% 6,000 45% 6,000 45% 5,600 45% 7,000
80% )’8,350 65% 10,350 71.5% 10,350 71.5% 10,350 50% 7,000 50% 7,000 50% 6,600 55% 9,000
70%;, 10,350 77%’:" 10,350 77%> 10,350 60% 77,000 60% >7,000 60% >6,600 60% >9,000
Single                                                Allowances
Person 500 575 575 620 665 865 1,115 1.515(b}
Married
Couple 800 920 920 1,010 1,100 1,730 2,230 2,630(b)
Child 200 230 230 240 240 240 218 195
Annual Average Industrial Earning5 in Tramportable Goods Industries (June)
Male 1974:2,186 1975:2,748 1976:3,189 1977:3,861 1978:4,430 1979:4,909 1980:5,875
Female 1,103 1,420 1,672 2,018 i 2,421 2,733 3,428
Consumer Price Index (June)
173          216          251          286           303          341          410
C
o
O
Ct~n[-rl
M
,’-1
:g
t-rl
<t-rl
(a) Supplementary, budget in which a 10 per cent surcharge was levied on all brackets above the 26 per cent rate.
(b) Figures include £400 schedule E employment allowance for one working person only.
(c) In 1980 the income tax bands for a married couple are double those listed here. m
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the income distribution is 1.2 times the average earnings. Consequently the
availability of the series on mean earnings enables us to estimate earnings dis-
tributions on the basis of knowing the moments. From this point the estimation
of the progress of average tax rates over the period is obtained by simulation.
By generating the income distribution through drawings of random normal
numbers with the appropriate mean and variance (now known), taking ex-
ponentials of these numbers, computing the tax allowances for different
household structures and averaging their marginal tax rates so obtained, we
arrive at the figures presented in each row of Table 3.3. This process is repeated
for each year to give the information for the whole time period.
Given the very strong trend evident in these figures (with the exception of
1980) and the assumptions made in computing them, some comments on possi-
ble biases are in order.
Table 3.2: Incomes of mortgage loan recipients
Average
£3,000- £4,000- £5,000- £7,000- Industrial
Year £3,000 £4,000 £5,000 £7,000 £9,000 £9,000    Wage
1978 10.7% 20.3% 24.9% 26.5% 17.6% £4,430
1979 7.1% 16.1% 17.8% 31.8% 16.0% 11.2% £4,909
1980 4.3% 12.3% 10.6% 30.1% 23.4% 19.3% £5,875
Apart from neglecting the PRSI contributions there are two reasons which
make the figures conservative, in the sense of exhibiting less change than may
actually have been the case. First, the earnings of spouses have been omitted.
The increasing trend in the labour force participation of women and the ten-
dency for people to marry those of similar economic backgrounds (Rivlin
(1975)) make the degree of underestimation in the marginal tax rates in the later
years greater than in the early years. This possibility is particularly likely for
1980 (see below). Second, there may be a sample selection bias associated with
the use of the factor 1.2 times the average wage as a means of deriving the in-
come distribution for the early years. This could arise because, if people had
not been moving imo the higher tax brackets as a result of inflation, there
would have been less of a tendency for higher income households to purchase
housing. As a consequence, the scale factor for the earlier years may be just 1. I
or 1.0 and such a figure would yield lower tax rates for those years.
The rate computed for 1980 shows a big decrease over 1979 for married
households. This is because of the income splitting provisions then introduced.
It is clear that from that time onwards the income tax schedule offers a much
greater incentive to single individuals to purchase housing than to married cou-
ples. Since the trend towards a greater percentage of housebuyers to be made
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FIGURE 3.1: Income dislributiona of house buyers, 1978
10.7 20.3 24.9 l 26.5 17.6
FIGURE 3.2:Income distributions of house buyers,.1979
Income in O00’s
7.1 16.1 1| 117.8| 31.8 16.0 II
FIGURE 3.3: Income distributiom of house buyerJ, 1980
ll.2
lb
Income in O00’s
i
12.3 10.6. 30.1 23.4 19.3
Income in O00’s
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tip of single individuals became manifest before 1980 the changes in income tax
schedule can be expected to accentuate this ceteris paribus.
In contrast to the possibilities for understatement of the marginal tax rate,
there are factors which ma)’ lead to bias in the opposite direction. First, some of
the new housebuyers/builders are in the agricultural sector where the marginal
rate of tax is usually zero. Second, there is the possibility ofoverstatemmt of in-
come to the lending agencies. The fact that the computations indicate that the
average house buyer has an income only 1.2 times that of the average industrial
wage earner should not be interpreted to indicate the unlikeliness of such an
overstatement, since the average industrial wage is computed for people of all
ages while the typical house buyer is at an early stage in the life cycle, generally
before the peak in the earnings profile is attained. On balance, however, it is
unlikely that these influences are strong enough to counterbalance factors such
as the neglect of a second income in a new house buying family.
We can conclude from this analysis that, on the basis of the information
available at present, the conventional wisdom regarding increasing tax rates is
indeed strongly borne out.
Table 3.3: Estimated average marshal tax rates for new house buyers, 1969-1980
Married
Single Married couple with
Year person couple one child
1969 26.5 26.3 26.3
1970 27.2 27.0 26,9
1971 27.6 27.2 27.0
1972 28.7 28.2 23.6
1973 31.0 30.2 29.8
1974 32.8 31.4 30.1
1975 39.7 37.5 36.2
1976 41.0 38.8 37.6
1977 40.6 38.5 37.9
1978 42.5 38.8 37.6
1979 45.0 39.9 38.6
1980 45.3 24.9 24.5
3.111. The Cost of Capital for House buyers - Theory
The cost of an owner-occupied house should be distinguished from its
pu÷chase price. The cost of a house in any time period is here defined as the
holding cost and this is related, in a non-linear fashion, to the price.
At the outset it should be realised that the cost of house purchase is not an
unequivocal concept. For example, the cost of purchasing a secondhand house
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is not the same as the cost of purchasing a new house due to the system of grants
or the different treatment of stamp duty. Nor is the cost of a house independent
of the ratio of down-payment to mortgage obtained due to income tax
regulations. Likewise the cost of house purchase is not synonymous with annual
carrying costs, since, for example, the grants payable to new house buyers are
concentrated in the early years. (The carrying costs, given the mortgage subsidy
scheme operating since 1981, actually increase in the first few years). The cost of
capital thus differs for different house buyers and in this regard is conceptually
distinct from what is customarily regarded as a price or cost, i.e., a measure
which is constant across economic agents in any given time period. Thus, what
emerges from constructing a cost of capital series is the cost for a typical
potential house buyer, not the cost for every house buyer.
Defining P, as the market price of a house is period t, y, the proportion of
equity owned, rm, the mortgage interest rate, re, the opportunity cost of capital,
D, the depreciation rate, M, maintenance costs, T, taxes attributable to
home ownership, G, grants and !bL the expected change in price in year t, the
gross effective cost of housing services in year t, (C) is thus
Cg=y,r~P,+(I-y,)rm, P
, 
+Dt+M,+T, -G,-P~             (3.3)
The first term of this equation is the opportunity cost ofequity and mi-ght also
be considered to be the imputed income to equity, the second represents
mortgage interest payments. The term Ib, states that if there is a capita[ gain the
effective cost is lowered.
Several points are to be noted in this formulation. 1~ is the actual rather than
the expected capital gain. If the cost of capital series were to be interpreted in an
ex-ante rather than ex-post sense (for example as a variable in an econometric
mode[ lbL would have to be replacted by P~,, i.e., the expected price appreciation.
This could be modelled, as is typically done, by using a time series
representation for Ib~ (see for example Rosen and Rosen (1980)). Further, as
there is DO taxation of capital gains on owner occupied houses in Ireland the
full gain enters the cost. This meaDs that it is possible to have a negative cost of
housing ser~,ices in years where price appreciation is large. (This can materialise
quite easily, see Atkinson and King (1980)).
Transactions costs (as distinct from taxes) have not been included explicidy
but CaD be captured through the variable M. Depreciation and maintenance
have been specified to be independent of the age of the stock.
The specification of taxes (T) independently of the price does not imply that
taxes are not capitalised in price ultimately. The market mechanism will ensure
that, if T falls in any period (as, for example, with the remission of rates in
1977/78), the resulting lower effective costs will boost demand and hence price
by some percentage of the capitalised value of the tax changes.
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The above specification of housing costs is "gross" in the sense that part o|
housing costs are deductible for tax purposes. This interpi’etation of gross is not
to be equated with gross in the sense of not including capital gain. To arrive at
the net cost of housing, allowance must be made for these deductions. Thus,
defining 8, as the percentage of each pound spent on housing which is tax
deductible (defined in Equation (3.6) below) andT, the marginal tax rate, it
follows that the net cost of housing services is
Cm = ( I - 60:,) C~ (3.4)
[t is appropriate at this stage, before proceeding to examine how numerical
estimates of the cost components can be developed, to consider the more
genera[ aspects of using the above described neo-classical type formulation of
the cost of house purchase. The major advantage of this is that it makes possible
the simultaneous examination of the effects of such variables as interest rates
and price changes. It is theoretica[Iy unsatisfactory to assume that the effects of
these can be examined separately. For example, in periods of rising mortgage
rates expected capital gain might he large and hence the effect of higher rates
could be associated with an increase in demand. But if higher rates are
accompanied by a small expected capital gain a decrease in demand would be
expected. Thus, in econometric models it should HOt he surprising if the
individual influences of interest rates and price expectations turn out to be
insignificant or ostensibly perverse.
What of the difficulties ? While this approach yields insights into the real cost.
of housing there are certain]’/approximations associated with representing a
world of discontinuities, non-price rationing and imperfect markets by one in
which smoothness is imposed.
O n a broader level, this specification of the cost of housing is a single period
representation of a variable which takes on different values over time, and in
making a tenure choice decision the relevant cost determinant would he more
than just the one period magnitude of the variable. For example, grants are
generally concentrated in the very early stages of home ownership while
property taxes ("rates") for much of the ’seventies were levied on a gradually
increasing basis. Likewise, maintenance and depreciation costs are not
independent of the age of the building. As a consequence, care must be taken in
both the construction of the cost variable and in the estimation of econometric
models in accounting for such time variations in the measure.
A second issue which is germane relates to "for whom" the cost of capital
should he defined. Given the differing circumstances of buyers the cost of
purchase will vary from one to another. For example, those purchasing houses
too large to qualify for grants will not he beneficiaries from this source of
finance. Since this is an aggregate study of the behaviour of house buyers the
approach adopted in dealing with measurement is simply to consider the
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typical individual. Thus, the cost of capital represents an average cost for those
who purchase during the period.
The last issue which warrants examination from the theoretical stand-point is
whether or not capital gains should be included, h is argued at times that, since
households who invest in a home rarely sell it and move to a rented dwelling,
capital gains are not realised. While it is true that rented dwellings do not offer
the occupier the same flow of services offered by a home (Bossons (1978)) and the
two are thus not perfect substitutes, it is clearly false to assume that capital gains
should not be included as a component in the cost of capital since households
could, if they so wished, realise such gains. To argue that capital appreciation
not be incorporated is equivalent to proposing that returns to an investment be
made dependent upon the motives of the investor. Thus, if households choose
never to realise the gains -- by, for example, moving to a smaller dwelling at a
later stage of the life cycle- the gains are indeed paper gains. But this choice
should not be equated with the belief that the gains are non-existent.
3.IV: The Cost of Capital: Measurement
In this section estimates are presented of the maguiiude of the gross and net
costs of capital as defined by Equation (3.4) for the period 1970-1980. The
implications of the figures are then examined. The section proceeds by simply
examining each component of Equation (3.3) and a description of the various
institutional details affecting each component is offered.
(a) Price Changes
The price appreciation term is taken as the one period ex-post changes in
prices.
(b) The Opportunity Cost of Capital (rc)
The opportunity cost of capital is approximated by the sub £5,000 deposit
rate offered by the Associated Banks. The reason for the use of the sub £5,000
rate is that most new house buyers over the period in question would own less
than £5,000 in equity. While, in the later part of the period, many purchasers
would have had in excess of £5,000 in equity, small variations in the level of the
opportunity cost of capital have almost insignificant effects on the cost of
housing index, see Equation (3.3).
(c) The Mortgage Interest Rate (rm)
The quarterly mortgage interest rate used is an average of the monthly rates
published in the Central Bank Quarterly Bulletin.
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A minor conceptual issue arises in relation to using a fixed rate of interest in
Equation (3.3). Since interest rates on mortgages have been variable and hence
future payments effectively unknown, we assume here that individuals view the
current rate as the best estimate of future rates and that it is this estimate which
governs their house purchase decisions.
(d) Proportion of Equity Owned (y)
The proportion of equity owned for the average new house purchaser is
unknown. This is because purchasers do not finance their houses in like manner
and thus data cannot be collected. What has been used in this study is an
estimate derived from figures on mortgage loans and average house prices. By
dividing the average mortgage loan given by all institutions(definedas the value
divided by number of loans) by the house price index a quarterly series for y
emerges.
This is probably an underestimate of the true value of y since some
purchasers of new houses (e.g., second time buyers or farmers) likely carry more
equity upon purchase than those buyers who borrow from the traditional
sources. But this is not a major concern since, given ra and rm, are close in value,
even’ substantial errors in y would not change the cost of capital appreciably.
(e) The Price of Houses (P)
This series is obtained from the Quarterly Bulletin of Housing Statistics. It is the
average price of all houses for which mortgage loans are approved in any
quarter by the major lending institutions. This series has been deflated by the
quality change index (discussed in Chapter 2) to yield a constant quality house
price index based upon the typical house built in 1970, I. To obtain the real (or
relative) price of housing this can be divided by the Consumer Price Index
(CPI).
(D Depreciation (D) and Maintenance (M)
In accounting for maintenance and depreciation we depart from the practice
of previous authors, e.g., Rosen and Rosen (1980), Laidler (1969), Aaron (1972),
White and White (1977) who typically use values of 2 per cent to 2.5 per cent of
the purchase price of the house -- drawing upon the 40-year depreciation
standard in the US tax code. In inflationary times such an allowance would be
trivial after several years while it probably overstates the true value for the first
few years. Accordingly a figure of 1 per cent of the current value of the house is
used.
It should also be noted that no inconsistency exists in the use of both capital
appreciation (P) and depreciation (D) terms. The capital gain term is estimated
upon the basis of comparing a new house in period t with a new house in period
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t+ 1. But when an investment is actually/made the capital gain is associated with
comparing a new house in period t with a one year old house in t+l. The
depreciation term is required for this comparison.
(g) Grants
While regulations governing the receipt of grants over the period have varied
there has been just one major change in the system of governments grants for
new houses. Prior to 1977 a bi-level system of grants from Local Authorities and
the Central Government constituted an important source of aid for new house
buyers. This was replaced by a single £1,000 lump sum grant payable to first
time purchasers of new houses in May 1977. Under the bi-level system the
Department of Local Government grant was payable to the builder while the
Local Authority grant (termed "supplementary") was payable direcdy to the
purchaser. Thus in computing the G term in Equation (3.3) only the
supplementary and £1,000 grants have been considered.
The value of a typical grant under the new regulations is here computed as
the total value of grants payable to purchasers of new houses constructed in the
private sector divided by the corresponding number of houses. Figures are
obtained from the annual reports of the DOE.
Since the grant is a one-time rather than a recurring payment, it is
incorporated into a change in the value of’y. That is, the effect of the grant is to
increase the purchaser’s share of equity in the house, not to lower its price.
(h) Taxes
The sole tax of any consequence on new housing during this period was in
the form of a valuation tax, termed the "rates". This tax was abolished in
january 1978. Prior to this date rates were levied on new housing which
qualified for grants on a sliding scale basis. One-tenth of the full amount due
was payable in the first year of ownership, two-tenths in the second year, etc.,
until year ten when the full amount was payable. This system was intended to
act as an inducement for the purchase of new rather than secondhand houses.
In computing the term T in Equation (3.3) we assume that house purchasers look
at the average value of rates payable in the future. This average is computed as
an annuity equivalent to the predicted series of actual payments.
Denoting R, as the full rates payable in any year t and r the interest rate,
payable is
(,)’    (,,i + T’Ti=IO Rt (3.5):E~., ib R, T-g’7 I + r
To solve for the equivalent annuity value this is equated to Za].lAt/(l + r)i and a
solution obtained for A,. In computing this series the interest rate used is the
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opportunity cost of capital defined earlier and a series on R~ was developed on
the basis of information obtained from the "Returns of Local Taxation".
Net and Gross Costs
The net and gross costs of home ownership differ because of the incentives to
own a home which are provided by the income tax system. The incentives are in
the form of (a) mortgage interest deductibility in the computation of taxable
income and (b) the non-taxation of imputed income from home ownership. To
compute the value of these savings it can be seen from Equation (3.4) that
estimates are required of the average marginal income tax rate for potential
&ouse buyers (~,) and of the proportion of gross costs which are deductible (6~)
over the period.
We can define 6, as 8,=y, rc, p’ +(l--y,) rmtP,
(3.6)
The first term in the numerator represents the non-taxation of imputed income
{i.e., if this amount were invested in another asset taxation treatment would be
less favourable), the second represents mortgage interest deductibility. In
computing this component of the series we use either the value of( 1 -- y,) r,,,P,
or the maximum interest deduction permissible under the income tax code.
An interesting feature of this formulation is that 81 need not decrease over the
life of the mortgage because the interest deduction decreases. This is due to the
fact that, as the interest allowance falls with the maturing mortgage the imputed
income component increases correspondingly. Further, there is no need for 8 to
be less than unit3,.
The average marginal tax rate for the time period is taken as the tax rate
which would be faced by fairly typical new house buyers -- i.e., a married
couple with no children. This rate is given in Table 3.3.
The resulting series for the net and gross costs of capital for housing on an
annual basis are given in Table 3.4. (This is obtained by simply summing the
quarterly values).
A striking aspect of the series is the negative cost associated with ownership.
The growing difference between the net and gross figures is attributable
indirectly to inflation, in that the increasing price of houses makes the tax
savings on imputed income and interest payments greater. This is compounded
by the behavlour of the marginal tax rate over the period. It is further to be
noted that this series is a simple cost of housing not the cost ofhousing relative
to renting. For those years where costs are negative the difference between
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owning and renting would be greater than the (negative) costs. Given that the
renta] market for this period was qu~te narrow we have not attempted to
establish a comparable rental series.
For the po]icy maker the most interesting aspect of the cost of capital relates
to how changes in the constituent elements bear upon the path of the series and
upon the path of house prices. For example, how did the announcement of the
abolition of rates in 1977, or the introduction of a new system of grants in 1978,
affect the cost of capital ? Or, how would an increase in the mortgage rate or a
change in the opportunity cost of funds have influenced the measure ? It is clear"
from Equation (3.3) that the instantaneous effect of such possibilities can be
estimated directly. But the full effects of innovations will take several periods to
work their way through the system since price expectations and hence the actual
future path of prices are determined by events in prior time periods. As a
consequence the price series and the accompanying cost of capital are best
viewed as difference equations.
Table 3.4: Cost of capital for new housing
Gross Cost of Net Cost of Gross Cost of Net Co~t of
Capital in Capital in Capital in Capital in
Nominalterms(a) Nominalterms(b) Realterrns(C) Realterrtu(c)
1970 -77 -165 -285 -610
1971 7 -88 26 -328
1972 242 129 771 411
1973 435 -591 -1239 -1682
1974 -557 -783 -1382 -1944
1975 -1088 -1411 -2225. -2884
1976 -885 -1336 -1505 -2273
1977 -351 -860 -529 -1298
1978 -1886 -2405 -2737 -3491
1979 221 -654 348 -1030
1980 -1933 .-3067 -2101 -3332
(a) See Equation (3.3)
(b) See Equation (3.4)
(c) Obtained by dividing the corresponding nominal cost by the Consumer Price Index
with 1980,4 = I00.
The implications of the figures presented in Table 3.4 are interesting. The
extremely high capital gains -- which even bring about negative costs in the late
’seventies -- must raise questions about the wisdom of subsidising housing to
the extent presently undertaken in Ireland. The effects of the income tax
regulations have, over the period 1975-1980, turned negative gross costs of
home ownership into even greater negative net costs.
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The distributional effects of measures which permitdeductions at the marginal
tax rate are in themselves very regressive. It was proposed in Chapter 1 that one
of the goals of housing policy should be to balance efficiency losses with
distributional gains. However, the structure of incentives -- primarily the
mortgage interest deductibi[ity and the non-taxation of imputed income
regulations -- are designed to yield a greater absolute benefit to those
purchasing larger houses and those with higher incomes. (Though, if imputed
income from home ownership were taxed, loan interest payments could be
allowed as an offset against capital income.) Thus, the ’seventies was not a
period in which equity and efficiency considerations were being balanced but,
on the contrary, one in which deadweight losses were being compounded by
distributional losses. The figures in Table 3.4 refer to a typical purchaser and
thus conceal the disparity which exists between purchasers in different
economic circumstances. For example, the 60 per cent marginal tax rate
individual would experience much greater gains than the 35 per cent marginal
tax rate individual.
l’he system of grants, mortgage subsidies, the non-taxation of imputecl
income, the abolition of property taxes all raise questions of the same nature--
though do not all compound the deadweight losses with further distributional
losses.
The focus of policy making in this area at the present time must be upon
recognising the inherent instability of the incentive system as it has operated in
the ’seventies. The rising demand for houses has brought about an increase in
prices. Tl~is in turn has led various governments to give greater subsidies to
housing in an attempt to bring ownership within the embrace of a greater
number of families. The unfortunate effects of such philanthropy are that house
prices become higher than would be the case in the absence of such stimulation.
While it is certainly the case that more families now benefit from owner
occupancy as a result of the incentive schemes, the cost (in both efficiency and
distributional senses) of such measures is high. This is because prices which
marginal buyers pay for their houses is higher, and in the distributional sense
the cost is also ,high because of the large quasi rents which accrue to the
suppliers of land. However, this goal is one towards which some degree of
progress could be made if different policy instruments were utilised. The
essential aspect of the ’seventies experience which has been important is that
while carrying costs in the early years of a mortgage can be high, the real
economic costs of home ownership can simultaneously be very low. In this
chapter we have shown that these costs have actually been negative in several
years. Housing has, thus, not been expensive. It is simply that the capital market
has been inflexible in its supply of mortgage instruments. High house prices
and high interest rates tilt the real mortgage repayments schedule such that
carrying costs relative to income a~e hi-gher ]-n the early years of a mortgage and
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lower in the later years compared with a situation in which inflation and interest
rates are low. Various forms of solution have been proposed to get round this
problem (see for example Lessard and Modigliani (1975), NESC (1976) or Thorn
(1983)). One solution, based upon the principal of relating mortgage payments
to income, has recently been adopted in Ireland for households on low incomes
in the setting up of the Housing Finance Agency.
A potential problem with such schemes for the mortgage supplying
institutions is that the outstanding capital owned by the borrower may increase
in nominal terms. A concern to the financial institution is thus whether the
equity share of the home owner could tend to zero, since such an outturn could
lead it to incur real losses in the case of bankruptcy of the borrower. However,
with a sufficient down payment and/or appropriate repayment conditions,
terms can be devised which would lead to arbitrarily small risks being incurred
by the lending institution.
The adoption of such schemes could do much to overcome the problem
associated with high carrying costs in the early years while at the same time
obviating the perceived need to subsidise housing to such a degree as is
presently done.
Having examined the pattern of the cost of home ownership for the ’seventies
a statement should be made in relation to its likely future path. It has been
shown here that the cost of ownership has been extremely low for the late
’seventies. This situation is unlikely to continue since the functioning of markets
will ultimately ensure that rates of return in different sectors of the economy
will tend to be equalised. The late ’seventies should be viewed, ex-post, as
characterising a disequilibrium in the asset markets. Reasons will be proposed
in Chapter 5 as to why negative costs could exist for.such a prolonged period.
Notwithstanding this, the argument in favour of increasing the flexibility of
capital markets rather than subsidising housing remains valid.
An important issue, from the efficiency standpoint, relating to the return on
investment and the cost of capital in the economy at large, concerns the
rates of return on assets. Hendershott and Hu (1981) and Summers (1980) have
argued that the returns to housing over several years have been greater than the
returns to the stock market in the US. In terms of the efficient markets literature
(see for example Fama (1970)) it might be surprising that rates of return in
different segments of the market could diverge for so long. But such divergence
has likely reflected the continual arrival of new information which maintained a
difference. While it lies beyond the scope of the present paper, it would be
valuable to examine how returns on housing in Ireland have compared with
returns in the stock market or alternatively to examine the path of the cost of
capital in each sector. Such comparisons could provide useful information on
whether or not the supply of capital has been efficiently allocated between the
different sectors.
Chapter 4
ECONOMETRIC MODELS
There have been three studies to date of an econometric nature which have
sought to examine the forces determining price and quantity in the market for
new private houses in Ireland. These have been by Nolan (1980), Kenneally and
McCarthy [ 1982a, J 982b) and Thorn (1983). A comprehensive review of different
specifications of housing models is not given here since such a review has
already been undertaken by Kenneally and McCarthy (1981). We thus
concentrate solely on the studies mentioned above and primarily upon the
latter ~,vo. The purpose of this chapter is, above all, to allude to the major
obstacles which have been met by these researchers and to point out the
direction in which modelling should progress. Itwill be argued here that each
of the studies has contributed to understanding the market but that interesting
questions remain unanswered. In the final section of the chapter, where the
functioning of the Irish market in particular is examined, it will be argued that
major changes must be incorporated into borrowed econometric models for
them to be applicable.
(a) The Nolan Model
Nolan specified a three equation quarterly model: A demand equation
explaining the number of houses demanded, a supply of housing starts
equation and an equation linking the supply of starts with completions.
The demand equation is specified as
PCMP =     [~NHPR, YR, STO~_a, HH, NHPDOT, CPIDOT, MR,
where PCMP
NI-I PR
YR
STO
HH
NHPDOT
CPIDOT
MR
INF
INFt_t)
private house completions
new house prices deflated by the CPI
average disposable income deflated by the CPI
stock of houses
number of households
rate of change of nominal house prices
rate of change of consumer price index
mortgage rate
inflow of funds to the building societies
(,~.1)
43
44 A STUDY OF NEW HOUSE PRICES IN IRELAND IN THE SEVENTIES
The rationale for including these variables is fairly straightforward though
criticism could be directed towards the specification of the equation and the
exact proxies used to capture certain influences.
The supply of starts equation is specified as:
PSTR -- flNHP, BC, IR, INF, C) (4.2)
where PSTR number of private house starts
NHP new house prices
BC building costs
IR interest rate charged to builders
INF inflow of funds to building societies
C capacity utilisation index
The supply of completions is then specified as a distributed lag function of
the supply of starts.
Nolan alluded to the data difficulties associated with this specification. The
supply quantity represents completions rather than sales - a not uncommon
difficulty with housing data. Second, there is a break in the completions series
in that the series was computed in a different manner after the end of 1976.
Nolan estimated various forms of these equations but encountered
difficulties in getting the equations to fit well, in the sense of yielding
coefficients of the expected sign.
Kenneally and Mc(~arthy ( 1982a1 (KM) have analysed this way of doing things ’
from various standpoints. First, they argue that a market clearing model is not
an appropriate one for markets such as housing, where lags exist between
purchase and completion. Second, the role of the housing stock is not clear.
Kenneally and McCarthy justify the use of this variable by using a stock
adjustment model. Further, the starts equation has not been specified in
accordance with any type of behavioural axioms and the lag structure between
starts and completions is specified as fixed, whereas in practice this is likely to
depend upon economic conditions. There is the problem of the discontinuity in
the completions series. Kenneally and McCarthy further take issue with the
estimated form of Nolan’s model in relation to the treatment of real and
nominal values and the interpretation of coefficients.
The rather disappointing empirical results which came from this paper
illustrated that, in order to be able to understand the behaviour of the housing
market, a more rigorous theoretical formulation of the model would have to be
undertaken. The search for a model which, in some sense, fits the data or gives
plausible coefficients for some variables while neglecting others which should be
crucial to decision-making rules, is bound to yield results which are
unsatisfactory both from a behavioural standpoint and the standpoint of policy
’ making.
FIGURE 4.1 : The market for private housing.
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(b) The Kenneally-McCarthy Model
In this regard the KM model constitutes an advance in our understanding of
the functioning of the market. This is an explicit quarterly model grounded in
decision theory which seeks to encompass not just those forces which impinge
directly on the market for private houses but which influence it indirectly via the
mortgage market, Local Authority housing, etc. The usefulness of this type of
model is clear. If one believes that the market behaves in the way the theoretical
model states then policies can be geared to achieve whatever aims are deemed
desirable.
The KM model is detailed in Figure 4.1 and Equations (4.3) through (4.11). In
general structure it is like the No[an model though considerably more detailed.
The demand side is based on a stock adjustment mechanism following on the
work of, for example, Muth (1960) or Jaffee and Rosen (1979). The supply side
relates a housing completions to a housing starts equation. The behaviour
underlying the supply side is based upon the theory of optimal inventory
holding.
The demand for housing, being the outcome of a stock adjustment
mechanism (Equation (4.4)), is a function of desired stock and lagged actual
stock. In addition, mortgage availability is a constraint upon the actual level of
demand -- though not upon the desired level. This variable is designed to
measure latent demand, which may be suppressed because of insufficient
availability of funds. The desired capital stock (Equation (4.3)) is a function of the
relative price of housing, the stock of Local Authority housing, household
formation, permanent income and the cost of capital for housing. The stock of
private houses in any period is the sum of the stock in the previous period plus
completions plus Local Authority sales (Equation (4.5)).
The supply side is specified in two parts. Housing completions are a
distributed lag function of housing starts with weights variable, depending
upon economic conditions (Equations (4.6), (4.7), (4.8)). Housing starts are then
a function of the desired level of inventory.
K*t =ao + aI(PHJP,) + a? Yp, + a3HF~ + a~CCH, + asKea~ (4.3)
Dt*aa)~ =ao(K* - K~-I) + ct6MAL (4.4)
KI = KH + COMI + KLSt (4.5)
COMT = WoHSt + Wn HSt_1 + .... (4.6)
WI = Ci + [3 [Zia =o U,-n/u + 1] (4.7)
HSt =Al, + COMt (4.8)
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A
AII =’Ol[I*
, 
- ll_1]
1~ =bo + biPHt + b2WAGt + b3RMt + b+F~ + b~SL
PH’)=a2[D,.dd,t-AK]Pt
(4.9)
(4.1o)
(4.11)
Source: Kenneally and McCarthy, (1982, a, p. 23).
CCH
COM
Otadd}
+F
HF
HS
I
1+
K
K¯
K~
KLS
MA
P
PH
RM
S
WAG
U
Yp
cost of capital for housing
completions of new houses
dernand for additions to stock
financial costs in the building of houses
household formation
number of housing starts
actual stock of inventories of builders
desired stock of inventories for builders
actual stock of private housing
desired stock of private housing
stock of Local Authority houses
sales o/" Local Authority houses
mortgage availability for housing
price of other goods
price of housing
raw material costs in house building
level of sales of houses
wage costs in house building
index of general cycle of housing demand
permanent income
Builders are perceived as having a desired level of inventory (I") which is
dependent upon economic factors (Equation (4.10)) and they adjust to this
desired level in accordance with a lagged adjustment mechanism (Equation
(4.9)}. Finally price adjusts by some percentage of the excess demand (Equation
(4.11)).
The model is estimated from reduced form equations. For the demand side
.an estimating equation is obtained by substituting Equation (4.3) into Equation
(4.4) and thence into Equation (4.11) to obtain a behavioural equation for price
to which a stochastic error term (ut) is then added, i.e.,
PHJP, = t(constant, YpL, HF,,CCH~, KLA,,’ K,_t, MA,, AK,, (PH/P),_t, u,) (4.12)
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For the housing starts an estimable equation is obtained by substituting
Equation (4.10) into (4.9) and then into (4.8) for AIt to yield an equation for
starts, i.e.,
HSt = g(eonstant, PH. WAG. RM. F,, S,, It_l, COM,, e,) (4.13)
A completions equation is obtained by substituting Equation (4.7) into
Equation (4.6) yielding a Don-linear equation, i.e.,
COMI = h(HS. HS~_=, HS,_2 .... Yt, Yt-l, Yt-2 ¯..,) (4.14)
This three equation stochastic quarterly model (with three further identities)
was estimated for the period 1969 IV to 1976 Ill using two stage least squares
and generalised least squares where there was an indication of non-spherical
en’ors. From the reduced form results, the parameters of the structural
equations can be retrieved. The important parameters were in general of the
right sign and most of the reduced form estimates were significant. The reduced
forms were found to fit well and the model, when dynamically simulated, was
found to track well for the variables in level form.
Thus, the theoretical development is appropriate. It recognises lags,
influences from other sectors of the housing market and non-Wa]rasian
mechanisms. But the estimates emerging from the model are DOt all
satisfactory. The elasticity of desired stock with respect to per capita income is
0.35 and with respect to the cost ofcapital is only 0.06. These are not plausible,
¯ as recognised by KM. The starts completions equation, however, yielded a
plausible weight structure and the starts equation tracked well.
The KM model is an extremely careful and well designed construct and given
the complexity and volatility of the regulations governing the housing market,
coupled with data inadequacies, it is not at all surprising that some of the
estimated coefficients should turn out to be of the wrong sign. There are
probably two ways in which the paper is deficient and, unfortunately, not both
of the deficiencies have obvious solutions. First, the supply side is based upon
inventory theory, while this is appropriate for a market where the bulk of
building is of the speculative type, it is less than appropriate for a mixed market
where much of the construction is of the "one-off" contract type. By the mid-
seventies about 35 per cent of the market, and by 1983, 60 per cent of the
market, was of this type (Jennings and Grist (1983)). However, the construction
of an econometric mode[ capable of encompassing both types of behaviour is a
rather tall order. Even if possible, present data series do not permit a separation
of variables describing each segment of the market. It is unlikely, therefore, that
much progress is feasible upon this front. The second difficulty relates to data
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-- a difficulty recognised by KM. They state that the major data deficiency ai
present is "the absence of a comprehensively defined cost of housing capital
series" (KM (1982, b, p.58)). On this front progress certainly can be made even
though the construction of such a series is more than a minor undertaking.
.Perhaps in future work researchers may be able to use the methodology and
results presented in Chapter 3 of the present research.
(c) The Thorn Model
In contrast to the papers by Nolan and Kenneally and McCarthy where a
structural model of the housing market is estimated within a supply/demand
framework, the paper by Thorn (1983) emphasises the role of housing as an
asset ila a portfolio, the price of which should adjust towards equating returns
accruing to the different assets in the portfolio. The model is a version of that
developed by Kearl (1979). Since this model provides an important mechanism
for examining the functioning of the whole of the Irish housing market, a
discussion of Thorn’s paper is undertaken in the following chapter.
Chapter 5
A POLICY ORIENTED ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE HOUSING
MARKET
5.I: Introduction
As the title of this chapter indicates, its purpose is twofold: First, it is to
examine the structure of the market for new houses and in particular the role
which is played by land. Second, it is to examine the efficacy of various
measures (both those implemented and those not) which have been proposed at
various times as methods of controlling the price of housing. For example, a set
of recommendations which could have had a major impact on the housing
market, but which have not yet been implemented are those contained in the
Report of the Committee on the Price of Building Land (1974). (This is also known as
the Kenny Report.).
The Report was undertaken at the request of the Government as a result of
concern over the rapidly escalating price of building land which had been
wimessed in the ’sixties. Based upon the belief that rents, which had accrued to
private land owners upon the transfer of land to building from some other
purpose and which had been generated in large measure by the servicing of
land by Local Authorities, should be captured for the benefit of the community
at large, the Report recommended that Local Authorities should have the right
to purchase land within designated areas at current use value plus 25 per cent. It
was also hoped that this would enable house prices to be kept lower since land
costs formed a considerable portion of total housing costs. (A minority report,
feeling that this recommendation would both b~: administratively very complex
and likely to encounter constitutional difficulties, recommended that an
alternative system~ embodying levies on land transactions not involving Local
Authorities and a system of "first choice~" for Local Authorities, be
implemented.}
To date the recommendations of the Report have not been implemented, but
have received renewed attention following the setting up of the Joint Oireachtas
Committee on Building Land in 1982 (seeJennings (1983 b) and Jennings and
Grist (1983)). Until recently, despite the low priority apparently assigned to
implementing the proposals, the implications of the Report for the likely
functioning of the housing market merit examination, not just because they
may conceivably be implemented at some future date, but because they are
. useful in illustrating how different segments of the market are interrelated.
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In the next section a theoretical model of price equilibration in the housing
market is presented. Then, Thorn’s paper and the many interesting
econometric questions it raises are analysed. This leads to an analysis of the
interrelationships between the various key segments of the market i land,
mortgages, the price of existing houses and the price of new houses.. This
development proves to be illuminating for the policy maker and it provides a
very useful vehicle for examining the general philosophy underlying, and the
long-term utility of, price controls in the market. Finally, the findings of the
Kenny Report and the more recently implemented price control scheme
involving "Certificates of Reasonable Value" are evaluated.
5.11: A Theoretical Model
From both a theoretical and policy standpoint the most satisfactory way of
examining the price of the housing stock is to recognise that the short-run
determinants may differ from the long-run determinants.
In any time period the amount of housing services is inelastically supplied
because of the fixity of the capital stock. Since net accretions to the stock on an
annual basis in Ireland form about 2½ per cent of the total in recent years, house
completions can be ignored as a determinant of the instantaneous price of
services. It thus follows that quasi rents accruing to stockholders are completely
demand determined. The supply of housing services, Hss, can consequently be
specified as a proportional function of the stock (H)
H~s = ~H (5.1)
The demand for housing services is determined by the price of the services,
PS, the price of all goods, P, income, Y, and demographic influences, D.
H~ = 0 (PS, P, Y,D) (5.2)
Equilibrium is determined by the Equations of (5.1) and (5.2)
Interest ultimately is in the pricing of the housing stock rather than the
services flowing from it. In very general terms, the demand for the stock
depends upon the return available on it versus the returns on other aspects
ceteria paribus. (For example, if the price of rental accommodation is low or if the
interest rate in the economy is high then the demand for owner-occupied
housing will be less.) Since the stock of housing is fixed, equilibrium in the
market is attained by the adjustment of the price (PH) such that the returns to
all assets are equalised. This equilibrium ensures that the existing stock will be
held. Arbitrage insures that the price of housing should adjust such that the
price of the services equals the cost of ownership.
PS = PH.CC (5.3)
where CC is the cost of capital. In simple terms, this equation means that if, say,
the value of services is £1,000 per year and the cost of capital is 8 per cent, then
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equilibrium price of the house would be £12,500. Given this view of. the
functioning of the market it is the price which is endogenous to the system.
From Equations (5.1) and (5.2) the equilibrium demand for the housing stock
can be written as
Hd ---0/~(PS, P, Y, D)--0/q~ (PH.CC, P, Y, D) (5.4)
From this the equilibrium relative asset price of housing is given by equating
the fixed supply ~ with demand Hd
PH
- ~’H, CC, P, Y, D) (5.5)
P
This model has a very simple interpretation as illustrated in Figure 5.1. In the
short run the supply of housing is fixed and represented by H ~. The equilibrium
price is thus determined by the position of the demand curve. With changes in
the cost of capital, income or the prices ofother goods the demand curve shifts
and the price of housing adjusts accordingly.
In the long run the equilibration mechanism is somewhat different. This is
illustrated in Figures .$.2 and 5.3. With a stable demand curve and the short-and
long-run supply curves given in Figure 5.2, the short-run equilibrium price is
given by PH’ and the long-run price by PHe. The flow supply per unit of time
(investment) is given in Figure 5.3. The positive slope reflects the higher costs
associated with increased rates of supply. With a price of P H’ the flow supply is
Riven 15y 1’. With the attainment of the long-run equilibrium housing stock He
the corresponding rate of investment Ie will be just sufficient to cover the
depreciatioil on existing buildings, i.e., Ie -~ 8He. Alternatively, if we choose to
define the long run as one in which there is a population steadily increasing at
the rate v (with the demand curve shifting and the price rising at corresponding
rates) the equilibrium rate of investment will be defined by Ie = (8 + v)H,_,.
With no constraints or imperfections in the msarketplace, Equation 15.-~)
could be estimated directly to determine the relative prices for some functional
form, given the availability of data. However, constraints govern the operation
of the market. This is particularly obvious in view of the historic negative cost of
capital for housing. Such a phenomenon could not continue indefinitely in a
competitive marketplace. The constraints which must be incorporated relate to
(a) the availability of mortgages and (b) the effects on monthly mortgage
payments of inflation.
The need for a mortgage availability constraint springs from the fact that
many purchasers would enter the market if they could financially lever
themselves to a sufficient extent. The fact that most potential buyers cannot
borrow 100 per cent of the purchase price of a house means that demand and
the subsequent equilibration of prices and service values are deferred.
The second constraint on the operation of the model springs from the fact
that, in periods of rising inflation, the mortgage payment relative to income can
.increase dramatically. The consequence of this is that buyers are constrained by
their current income in their ability to sustain high mortgage payments.
PH
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FIGURE 5.2: Price and quaatity equilibration in the long run
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With higher inflation and nominal interest rates the relative real burden of
mortgage payments rises in the early years of the mortgage life. Despite the fact
that the real financial position of the household does not deteriorate with
inflation (assuming real incomes remain constant), it is only in future years that
higher nominal incomes result from inflation - the higher incomes which are
necessary to meet loan repayments. Those households who undertake a
mortgage commitment with constant payments in such circumstances
experience a severe reallocation of consumption over their life cycle. Their
decision to invest in housing implies greater savings in the early years in return
for greater consumption subsequently.
The effect of inflation on the house purchase decision is, as a result, twofold.
The expected capital gain, which will induce a greater demand, is incorporated
in the cost of capital. The greater financing cost, however, will moderate this.
Incorporating these changes into the model means that Equation (5.5)
becomes
PH/P = f(H,CC, P, Y, D, MA, INTY) (5.6)
where MA represents the mortgage availability term and INTY the mortgage
interest paid relative to income.
The theoretical operation of this system is straightforward. Changes in
demand give rise to an immediate change in relative price. This further feeds
back into price expectations and the price will adjust to its new equilibrium
over several time periods with its path depending upon mortgage availability
and the ratio of payments to income.
The foregoing is a fairly general description of the pricing mechanism in the
housing market. Given that the major focal point of this paper is an
examination of the pricing mechanism and, further, given that much emphasis
has been placed upon the role of the "economic" vai’iables in this mechanism,
this should not be interpreted to mean that households are viewed as acquiring
housing purely for investment reasons. There now exists a relatively large
literature which has examined the reasons for why some households choose to
rent rather than purchase a house. Weiss (1978) proposes that the tenure choice
decision is influenced by the degree of efficiency which a household has in the
production of household services. For example, individuals who like gardening
or carpentry would be more likely to purchase than rent. Henderson and
Ioannides (1983) on the other hand, coqcentrate upon the degree of utilisation
of the property in the tenure choice. Bossons (1978) focuses upon the life cycle
characteristics of individual households who face the future with uncertainty.
For example, those in professions characterised by a need for mobility are more
likely to rent than own, while households with larger families are more likely to
own than rent. Artle and Varaiya (1978) examine decision making in a certainty
context where the tenure choice depends upon how ownership would distort
the optimal asset accumulation plan over the life cycle. For example, ownership
may require that individuals accumulate assets at a time when dissaving would
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be preferable, as in the case of young households on a low part of their earnings
profile, or in the case of older households who might wish to consume some of
their asset stock.
The common aspect of all of these views is a recognition that (i) home
ownership is undertaken for a variety of reasons, (ii) home ownership is by no
means a perfect substitute for rental accommodation and (iii) the ownership of
a house means that individuals have both an asset and a consumer durable. The
fact that, in this paper, the pricing of housing is viewed as being determined in
the short run by means of a quasi portfolio model in no way implies that this is
the only channel of influence on house prices nor does it imply that housing is
purchased only qua asset. It simpl;/means that in the short run, with relatively
fixed demand, the major forces c~.using price fluctuations are those related to
economic variables such as interest rates, inflation, economic cycles, etc., while
in the longer run the socio-demographlc type factors influence prices.
Returning temporarily to econometric work, it is a version of the foregoing
model which Thorn (1983) has estimated based on some modifications
proposed by Buckley (1982) and a further suggestion by Kearl (1979). Buckley
proposed that house prices evolve over time in accordance with excess demand,
i.e.,
PH     PH k
where H,d is the demand for housing services and Hs,_L is the available amount
of services in period t-l. Kearl proposed that, in addition to considering
current income as a constraint on the acquisition of a mortgage, the
independent effect of the "duration" of the mortgage should be considered.
Duration is a term developed by Macaulay (1956) to describe the tilting effect of
inflation on the ratio of mortgage payments to income over the life of the
mortgage. The higher is the ratio in the early years relative to the latter years the
greater the tilt of the payments scheme. Macaulay’s measure is defined by
where t denotes time, RQ(t) the real quarterly mortgage payment in each
period, T the time horizon and d the discount factor such that d = 1/(1 + r), r
being the interest rate. With a constant mortgage payment (5.8) reduces to
This can also be viewed as the elasticity of the present discounted value of the
stream of payments with respect to d. It can readily be verified that aD/ar 5: 0.
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The estimating equation which results from all of this is
Aln (PIMP)f ao + al UC + a2 ln RQ + a31n D + a, h MA + a~ ln Y
PH
+ a6 In DF-kln( --~ . HK)H + 6,
(5.10)
where variables are defined as above with the addition that UC is the user cost
of capital, Y is production in the transportation goods industry, DF represents
demographic factors and HK the stock of owner occupied housing.
The results for the model are astonishing given the variables used and the
somewhat arbitrary choice of specification. All of the estimated coefficients are
of the expected sign and significant at the 5 per cent or l per cent level of
confidence.
Despite this, serious doubts must be cast on the estimates for the following
reasons. First, as stated by Thom, the model is not robust to different
specifications of the mortgage availability variable, MA. Second, again as stated
by Thom, when an income measure rather than a production measure is used
for Y the coefficient % is not found to have the expected positive sign. Third,
and this is a point upon which Kearl as well as Thom errs, the variable D really
has no role in an optimising model and its role is that of a nuisance variable. It
has been argued extensively by Anastasopoulos and I rvine (I 984) that Kearl fails
to recognise that the payments path chosen by house purchasers is a choice
variable if they can afford the initial payment. It is not determined by inflation.
Consequently the insertion of the variable D only serves to introduce
inefficiency into the coefficient estimates. Finally it is to be noted that the model
is rather strangely specified in that there is no explicit development of the
suppl~) side. The model appears to be a short-run model with prices determined
by the intersection of a shifting demand curve and a fixed stock of housing
which slowly changes over time. However, the price variable is for new houses,
not the existing stock. Given this, it would be expected that the supply side
would have been modelled. But it is not. Only the demand side is modelled.
It is to be concluded from this that a great deal remains to be ascer:ained
about the price equilibration mechanism in the housing market. In particular
there remain two important developments. First, suitable data series must be
developed - as we have already pointed out. In the second place estimation
should not simply proceed upon the basis of econometric models borrowed
from other researchers. Model building must recognise the institutional details
of the Irish market. This relates in particular to the role played by mortgage
institutions, the system of short-run price controls and the conceptual
distinction between the markets for new and secondhand houses.
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5.III: Controlling the Price of Housing: Kenny, CRVs and the Price of Land
It was proposed earlier that the role played by land in the housing market is a
key one. The price of land, land being an input into the productive process, is
determined ceteris paribus by supply and demand. The demand factors are
related to the price of the final goods (housing, industrial use, etc.,) for which it
is used. Consequently, the subsidisation of housing, ceteris paribus, increases
land prices and while it ma~y appear, from an accounting standpoint, that
higher land prices are responsible for higher housing prices the factors
influencing the demand for houses, in fact, manifest themselves in the price of
land. This essentially is the argument proposed earlier.
In analysing the path of prices in the housing market a distinction must be
maintained between the new housing market and the market for existing
houses. When shocks impinge upon the system, from a position of equilibrium,
which increase the equilibrium price of housing (in periods of no limit on credit
availability), it would be expected that the market price of secondhand housing
would reach its new equilibrium quickly in response to a demand increasing
exogenous shock, the dine depending primarily upon the speed at which
information becomes avialable. In periods where credit restrictions exist the
attainment of the new equilibrium will be slower. Even in this case, however,
the attainment of the new equilibrium should never be longer than two to three
quarters since a sufficiently high number of houses are purchased without
mortgages and hence the purchasers are not credit constrained. (Published
figures on housing loans indicate that perhaps 40 per cent of purchases in
recent years may have been undertaken in this way.) Even at this point a further
distinction must be drawn between the behaviour of the whole market for
secondhand houses and that segment of the market for which price data exist.
The published data are based upon prices made available only by the principal
lending agencies, as opposed to being a representadve index of all transactions.
Consequently, econometric testing of whether or not the market equilibrates quickly will be
biased in the sense of overestimating the adjustment period.
One of the interesting aspects of the research to date upon house prices is
that the focus of attention has been upon the market for new houses despite the
fact that this is conceptually a much more complex segment to examine than
the market for secondhand houses. Much of this complexity arises from the
roles which rationing and price controls have played. Rationing has been
important because funds from the mortgage granting agencies have been
limited at particular times because interest rates have been below the
equilibrium rate. Price controls have had an increasingly important role with.
the extension of the system of Certificates of Reasonable Value (CRV) over the
period 1973 to the present.
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Since price controls play what is perceived to be a central role in housing
policy their operation warrants serious examination.
The effects of price controls CaD most easily be understood by considering the
three major blocks in the private housing market -- the stock of existing
housing, the flow of new houses and land. The adjustment in the price of new
houses works sequentially through these three blocks. From an initial steady
state in which prices equilibrate supply and demand, consider again the effects
of a boost in demand for housing services, for example, generated through a
rapid growth in income or an increase in government financed incentives. The
initial manifestation of the demand increase will be in the market for the
existing stock of houses. Prices will increase since there are no controls. In the
CRV covered market for new houses, on the other hand, the prices charged are
those permitted under the scheme. Being based primarily upon historic cost,
the prices in this segment will be slow to adjust. However, not all new houses
during the period carried or required a CRV or exemption certificate. While
regulations governing CRVs have varied during the ’seventies there has always
remained a substantial proportion of new houses outside the scheme, for
example, large new houses sold to non-first time buyers or non-mortgage
financed houses. (Figures on CRV numbers are obtainable from the Department
of the Environment Annual Reports.) The incentive for builders to stay within the
CRV scheme has been that, by so doing, their houses would be more attractive
to potential buyers. However, if by opting not to obtain a CRV a higher price
could be obtained, then there is an incentive to bypass the controls system. By
the end of the period under consideration CRVs were made mandatory not just
to qualify for government grants but for the receipt of a mortgage from any of
the lending agencies. This extension would seem to have been undertaken with
a view to widening control on the price of new houses.
The question regarding CRV covered house prices then relates to whether
this segment of the market can stay out of line, in the sense of offering housing
services at a lower unit cost in the long run, because of the existence of controls,
than the uncontrolled secondhand segment. The answer is dearly no. The role
which land prices play is what ensures this. Since the price of land is determined
by its best use, the market for uncontrolled houses, the price of land which all
developers and builders must pay will increase. The following generations of
new houses including those covered by the CRV scheme will thus increase in
price. Such price increases are permitted under the operation of the price
controls scheme since they represent higher costs incurred by the builder.
What, then, are the effects of the system of controls ? In the short run controls
will be effective in a rising market but in the long run their effects will be
minimal as far as controlling prices is concerned, though they will likely have .
redistributional consequences. That controls will be effective in the short run
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for a large part of the market under the widened scope of the CRV system (i.e.,
that segment depending upon being able to obtain a mortgage to finance their
purchase) is likely true. The segment more likely to avoid the controls is that
composed of the "one-off’’ houses purchased by households not requiring a
mortgage.
I n the medium and long term, in contrast, the effects of price controls are not
as clearcut. Ira situation exists in which housing services supplied by new houses
are lower in price than those supplied by the stock ofexisting houses (with the
disequilibrium temporarily sustainable by controls and a shortage of mortgage
funds) the price of land will adjust in the upward direction. This adjustment will
obviously occur in the uncontrolled segment of the market very quickly, in that
landholders supplying the potentially uncontrolled segment (primarily "one-
off’’ and small "estate" developments) will be able to obtain higher prices. This,
in conjunction with the fact that builders recognise that higher prices are to be
obtained in the final goods market, implies that the price ofo.//land supplied
for house construction will increase. In simple technical terms, the higher price
of housing services in the secondhand market has the effect of shifting the
builder/developer’s demand curve for land, and with an upward sloping supply
of land curve (see White and White (1977)), the price of land increases. (See
Figure 5). The actual increase will depend upon the various underlying
elasticities. When the land is subsequently used for construction the higher
price paid for it will appear in the form of higher prices. The higher prices
charged in these following periods do not contravene the CRV system of
controls since the latter are based upon mark-up/accounting principles.
To answer the question originally posed regarding the effects of price
controls, the answer is that, while perhaps effective in the short run, the
FICURr: 5.4 : Determination of the price of land.
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From the initial equilibrium (Ph LI) an increase in the value of
housing services shifts the builder’s/developer’s demand for land.
With an upward sloping supply curve the price of land increases.
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principal long run effects relate to the distribution of capital gains but not to the
equilibrium price of housing. Rather than the builder obtaining a capital gain,
in response to some demand increasing shock, the buyer obtains the capital
gain because he is able to purchase at a price below the new equilibrium and the
land supplier is unaffected.
¯ The efl’ects of-the controls are aJso asymmetric in two senses. First, the builder
of new houses will rarely reap a substantial capital gain, though he may
experience losses. This arises because of the mark-up type pricing scheme
permitted by the CRVs. Second, the time path of new house price adjustment
should be more rapid in periods where market conditions are slack (since
downward price movements are unfettered) but may be slow in periods where
demand is high in the CRV covered sector¯
Having established that the major efiect of the system of pri/:e controls is
redistribntional by means of understanding the time theoretical inter-
relationshipsin the marketplace, it is interesting to see if this framework can
throw any light upon the likely effects of the proposals embodied in the Kenny
Report¯
The majority report is interesting because, while it indicates at-the outset
.(e.g., paragraphs 7, 12, 14) that Ricardian principles governing the demand for
land have been understood, these principles have seemingly been ignored in the
recommendations. Paragraph 73, for example, states
When the local authority decides to dispose of land within a designated
area for building purposes, we think it desirable that they should do so by
making agreements with builders . . . and that these should impose
stipulations as to the type of building and its price¯
¯.. The scheme will strengthen the powers of local authorities and will, we
think, enable them to introduce some element of price control of new
houses.
Thus, compulsory purchase of land at below market price is seen as a
mechanism whereby lower new house prices can be attained. In the absence of
an increase in supply, the falsity of this proposition is evident from our
foregoing discussion. The coming onto the market of new houses at prices less
than those existing in previous time periods will disturb the equilibrium
existing between new and secondhand houses, ceteris paribus. With a switch in
demand towards the new houses, an excess demand for these will develop if the
price is not permitted to rise to the pre-existing level. Passing on the benefits of
low priced land to the buyer would thus necessitate a rationing mechanism, the
consequences of the "successful" operation of which would be to give an
immediate capital gain to this initial buyer. (To stipulate that the purchaser._be
required to hold the hou~ for a minimum time period - as has been proposed
by some - is hardly penance with a guaranteed high return to the investment.)
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Such a scheme would have no effect on the price of secondhand houses if the
same total supply of additions to the housing stock were forthcoming each year,
since people who previously were willing to purchase a secondhand house
would still be willing to do so at the same price (ceee~ paribus) if they were not
successful in obtaining a "rationed" house¯ On this level, the methodological
shortcoming of the Kenny Report lies in not visualising the role played by the
price oftheflow of housing services which is determined (from the demand side)
by the stock of housing. To believe that the price of an asset can be changed in
this environment, by changing the price 6fan inl~ut used in producingaccretioru
to the stock, represents a misunderstanding of the forces which determine asset
prices. The fact that the price of a new house can be "attributed" to its
components does not mean that if one of the component prices is lowered that
the price of the house will correspondingly fall. A consistent policy aimed at
reducing house prices requires that, if input prices are lowered, the incentives to
purchase output must be changed at the same time. For the Kenny Report
recommendations to be effective in lowering the price of the housing stock they
would have to result in an increase in the annual flow of new houses. In this way
the price of the stock could be lowered in the long run but not in the short run
since the stock is effectively fixed. If it were the case that substantial tracts of
serviced land could come on stream more quickly then the supply of housing
could increase and the equilibrium price would fall.
A final comment on the sale of land purchased compulsorily is in order. One
of the committee’s purposes was to ensure that some of the rent (primarily
caused by servicing with water and sewerage facilities) be captured by the Local
Authorities for the benefit of the community. If the recommendations
regarding compulsory purchase were to be implemented, rent capture could
still be ensured by simple resale (e.g., by auction) to a developer or builder at
market price. The funds so obtained could then be used for the development of
social amenities, parks, Local Authority housing or whatever the communit3,
deems desirable. This redistributive goal, however, in the absence of a long-run
increase in the supply of building land, should not be confused with the
objective of lowering the equilibrium price.
It is not the purpose here to judge whether or not compulsory purchase
should be pursued - this involves legal, normative and administrative feasibility
considerations. It must be realised, however, that to disregard the price
determination mechanism from the macro standpoint will result in a situation
where prices__for the stock of housing maynot decrease and that the ma~ior effect
o| controlling new house prices will be to give an immediate and substantial
capital gain to initial buyers (who will be unlikely to represent the lower tail of
the income distribution in any case). This outcome is hardly what the Kenny
Report writers had in mind in designing their scheme.
Chapter 6
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Q
The purpose of this paper has been to offer an explanation of the functioning
of certain aspects of the market for private new housing in Ireland during the
’seventies and t6 quantify the influences of certain variables upon prices. Given
that very large amounts of society’s resources are invested in housing each year
(both by the private sector and by the government) and given the manifest
concern with rising prices, the goal of forrnulating policies which are consistent
with stated social and economic objectives is an important one. It is hoped that
the findings of this study will be of interest and use in formulating policy. The
findings are the following.
6.I: Housing Quality
The first aspect of the housing market discussed was the evolution of the
quality of new houses. While this has already been documented for the latter
part of the ’seventies, the reasons for this general trend were examined and
implications drawn for empirical research on house prices. It was proposed
that, in addition to the effects of higher incomes and on expanding population,
the evolution of higher quality has been attributable to the structure of state
grants, the existence and subsequent abolition of rates together with
regulations governing thtir sliding scale remission when operative, the
structure of development of building sites, the housing market recession of
1974/75, the cost of working capital, the role of price controls and to the general
battery of incentives to purchase housing.
An index of quality corrected house price was then developed and it was
shown that the real increaze in the price of services supplied by new houses in the late
"seventies is overstated unless provision for such changes is made.
6.11 : Taxation
The second issue examined is the role which the income tax schedule has
played as an incentive for investment in housing. It has been an almost
universally held belief that (a) households have faced increasing marginal tax
rates and (b) that there has thus been an increasing incentive to purchase
housing because of the provisions of the income tax code permitting the
deduction of mortgage interest payments.
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To examine proposition (a) a logistic curve was fitted to data available for a
subperiod and the resulting moments of the income distribution of
housebuyers were then used to estimate the time path of the average of the
marginal tax rates. The results indicated that the tax rate facing purchasers has
increased from about 26 per cent in 1969 to around 40per cent in 1979 due to the lack of
full indexation in the tax schedule, but the income splitting provisions of the
1980 Budget lowered this considerably for married couples. While the tax rate
thus increased substantially it was then argued that this provision alone was not
sufficient to encourage investment in housing rather than any other asset. The general
provision for interest deduction (rather than just mortgage interest) would
ensure invesu’nent in a variety of(orms were it not for the fact that housing
provides a very good form of collateral and has been perceived as an asset which
would likely yield a higher non-taxable capital gain.
6. I I 1 : Cost of Capital and Subsidies
In view of the growth in the number of new housing units it would have been
surprising had the cost of home ownership been growing at the same rate as that
suggested by the rate of growth in prices. Accordingly, the cost of ownership
(which we have also termed the cost of capital) for new house purchase was
examined in Chapter 3.
A comprehensive theoretical measure of the cost of capital was first
developed. This was designed to take account, not only of such factors as the
mortgage interest rate and the opportunity cost of capital, but the effects of
property taxes, depreciation and maintenance, capital gains, income tax
provisions and government grants. The resulting numerical estimates showed
that the cost of capital for new home purchase has been strongly negative for several years
in the "seventies. This has been attributable primarily to the substantial capital
gains which have materialised and to the savings on income taxes.
These negative costs raise at ]east two questions. First, is it necessary to
subsidise housing to the extent then undertaken? Second, what are the
mechanics of the operation of the market which have permitted continual
capital gains? -
It would seem that subsidisation is undertaken because of the recognition of
the high carrying costs relative to income despite the resulting gains to
households at all ranges of the income distribution. If carrying costs concerns
are the reason for subsidisation it is unclear why the government has not been
more active in mortgage policy by providing incentives to mortgage granting
institutions to vary the type of mortgages offered. The availability of alternative
instruments would obviate much of the perceived need for the present costly
subsidisation of housing which permits effects which are very regressive in the
income distributional sense. Of course, it can also be asked why the Building
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Societies themselves have not offered alternative types of mortgage instruments.
Perhaps their dominant position in the housing market, made possible by their
tax treatment, has meant that competitive forces have not forced them to be less
risk averse and more innovative in the type of mortgages offered¯ (For a
discussion of such instruments see Lessard and Modigliani (1975) ~.nd NESC
(1976)).
While recent governments have made movements in this direction, in the
form of the H ousing Finance Agency, the question of why such instruments are
being proposed only for low income groups remains curiously without an
answer. The distributional consequences of high and middle income
households being financed by subsidised interest rates with lower middle and
lower income households paying higher rates are severe. When the historic
practice of permitting mortgage interest deductions to be made at households’
marginal rates of tax is imposed upon the interest subsidisation policies, a
pattern of subsidisation emerges which is extraordinarily regressive.
The second question, concerned with the equilibration of markets, was
examined in Chapters 4 and 5. Here it was argued that restricted mortgage
availability, the constraining role of current rather than life cycle incomes and
possibly inaccurate forecasts of prices have prevented immediate equilibration.
It should be noted at this stage that the intent of the findings on the cost of
capital is not to argue that it is only (or even primarily) low cost of capital which
has stimulated the demand for housing. The demographic and income
expansions of the period have probably been at least as important in boosting
demand. The reason why so much emphasis has been placed upon the cost
aspect is that, to date, no systematic attempts have been made to measure
such an influence. The relative importance of the low cost of capital, the growth
of income and demographic factors is something which may be examinable by
econometricians in the future.
6.1V: Econometric Work
In Chapters 4 and 5 the econometric work on the functioning o(the housing
market was reviewed. It was argued here that substantial insights into the
operation of the market have been generated by the existant work, though
unfortunately the statistical estimates arrived at by the researchers are still somewhat
unsatisfactory.
6.V: The Housing Market and Controls
In Chapter 5 a model of the functioning of the whole housing market was
offered. This consisted of an examination of the interrelationships between the
market for the existing stock of houses, the flow of new houses and the land
¯ market. By recognising the essential difference between stocks and flows and
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further recognising the fact that new house prices do not move from one
equilibrium to another instantaneously it was possible to draw inferences in
relation to current issues of policy. In particular it was illustrated that theprimaO,
effects of price controls are redlstributive and that their long-run effect on the price of even
new houses should be negligible. The use of this model further provides a vehicle for
examination of the proposals in the Kenny Report. The principal theme of this
chapter is to illustrate that the determination of equilibrium prices must be
viewed from a hehavloural rather than an accounting framework. One of the
most unfortunate aspects of policy making in recent years in relation to
controlling prices has been that, even though praiseworthy in intent, the major
long-run effects of the system of new house price controls have had little to do
with controlling prices. If the principles governing the formation of prices and
the interrelationships between the different segments of the market were
recognised, the possibility of formulating policy designed to achieve certain
social and economic objectives would be greatly enhanced.
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